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A RIGHT OF FAIR DISMISSAL: 
ENFORCING A STATUTORY GUARANTEE 
Janice R. Bellace* 
Support for the concept that employees should be protected against 
wrongful dismissal continues to grow in this country. 1 Yet, many ad-
vocates of protection have thus far refrained from venturing into the 
legislative arena. Even though the movement to achieve this protec-
tion is still at an early stage, it is not too soon to focus on specific 
proposals designed to translate ideals into protections. By failing to 
coalesce behind a single proposal, supporters have retarded the pro-
gress of the movement. Without a proposal for specific legislation, 
supporters lack a rallying point and legislators have nothing concrete 
to debate. This Article attempts to meet this need by providing a pro-
posal which not only satisfies the criteria of those advocating protec-
tion, but also responds to the concerns of those opposing such a right. 
The United States' position on unfair dismissal is out of step with 
the world standards reflected in the new Convention of the Interna-
tional Labour Organisation ("ILO") on termination of employment. 2 
This Convention sets forth basic minimum protections which every na-
tion should afford its working people - protections supported by most 
major industrial nations, but which American workers do not yet 
possess. The need for the United States to take action to comply with 
world standards on unfair dismissal serves as a further impetus to 
action. 3 
Critics have asserted that comprehensive protection against wrongful 
dismissal cannot be implemented in the United States without creating 
an expensive bureaucracy and disrupting existing arbitration 
* Assistant Professor of Legal Studies and Management, The Wharton School, University 
of Pennsylvania. B.A., 1971, J.D., 1974, University of Pennsylvania; M. Sc., 1975, London 
School of Economics. 
I would like to thank Mr. Jean-Jacques Chevron and Mr. Alan Gladstone of the International 
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I. See generally Individual Rights in the Workplace: The At-Will Issue, 16 U. MICH. J.L. 
REF. 200 (1983); CoMM. ON LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, At-Will Employment and the Problem 
of Unjust Dismissal, 36 REc. A.B. CITY N.Y. 170 (1981). 
2. 1982 Convention Concerning Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer, 
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, PROVISIONAL RECORD OF SIXTY-EIGHTH SES-
SION No. 30A (June 21, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Convention]. 
3. See Summers, Introduction, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 201, 203 (1983). 
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arrangements. 4 Nevertheless, other major industrialized nations, such 
as Great Britain, have implemented unfair-dismissal protection without 
erecting expensive bureaucracies. Many of these practices can be im-
plemented by the individual states; indeed, this Article will show that 
the machinery for implementing this right is already in place in every 
state. This Article proposes the state-by-state adoption of a simple 
statutory guarantee of protection from unjust discharge. This protec-
tion would be enforced through the same procedures presently used 
for state unemployment compensation claims. The advantageous features 
of this proposal are its low cost, comprehensive coverage, and ease 
of implementation; features which make its timely adoption feasible. 
Before setting out the proposed system, it will be useful to describe 
the evolution and status of world standards on unfair dismissal and 
how those standards can be implemented in a major industrialized na-
tion. Part I discusses the ILO Convention and its substantive and pro-
cedural requirements. Part II describes how these ILO standards have 
been implemented in Great Britain, a country with a labor law history 
and practice quite similar to that found in the United States, and 
highlights those practices capable of imitation. Part III explains how 
every state can implement ILO unfair-dismissal standards and British 
practices through existing state mechanisms. A description of the Penn-
sylvania unemployment claims procedure will illustrate that existing 
systems require only minor modification to accommodate the proposed 
statutory goal. This Article concludes that such a statutory guarantee, 
implemented at the state level through existing procedures, is both timely 
and feasible. · · 
I. WORLD STANDARDS ON UNFAIR DISMISSAL 
The United States stands virtually alone among Western industrialized 
countries in failing to provide a remedy for employees wrongfully 
dismissed. Presently, there is no federal or state statutory protection 
against unfair dismissal. 5 Notwithstanding much discussion on the ero-
sion of the employment-at-will doctrine, 6 most state courts remain un-
willing to entertain suits claiming that a discharge breached the employ-
ment contract unless the employee can prove that some contract term, 
express promise, or formal employer policy supports the claim.' Because 
4. See, e.g., Schauer, Due Process for Nonunionized Employees - Discussion, 32 PROC. 
ANN. MEETING INDUS. REL. RESEARCH Assoc. 183 (1979). 
5. For a brief survey of recent federal and state bills which have not been enacted, see The 
Employment-At-Will Issue, Ill LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 23, at 9-12 (Nov. 22, 1982) [hereinafter 
cited as BNA REPORT]. 
6. See Note, Reforming At-will Employment Law: A Model Statute, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 
389, 394-402 (1983). 
7. See BNA REPORT, supra note 5, at 33-65 (survey of state court decisions). 
WINTER 1983) Statutory Fair Dismissal 209 
few Americans have entered into written employment contracts and 
many companies lack formal disciplinary standards, the available 
avenues of legal redress are effectively closed to most discharged 
persons. 8 
Protection against unfair dismissal need not come from governmental 
sources; for instance, ILO standards could be met by using voluntary 
arbitration where the arbitrator has the authority to award an effec-
tive remedy. Those Americans working under collective bargaining 
agreements have adequate protection against unfair discharge because 
of the use of certain voluntary procedures. 9 Yet, a mere twenty-five 
percent of the work force is protected in this fashion; 10 for the re-
maining seventy-five percent, non-governmental protection is virtually 
nonexistent. 11 Persons in this latter group seem to content themselves 
with filing for unemployment compensation when they are dismissed, 
knowing that they may be qualified for benefits so long as they were 
not discharged for willful misconduct. The dearth of cases on wrongful 
dismissal indicates that very few in this group file suit. This may be 
because they are aware there is no legal right to be discharged for a 
valid reason, or perhaps because the idea of undertaking the expense 
of litigation cannot be realistically entertained by most persons who 
have suddenly and unexpectedly become unemployed. 12 
In any event, the American practice of not guaranteeing workers 
a right of fair dismissal diverges from that of other industrialized coun-
tries. Indeed, the American position on whether employees should be 
protected against wrongful dismissal is in a class by itself based on 
8. For a review of the law on protection against unjust dismissal, see Blackburn, Restricted 
Employer Discharge Rights: A Changing Concept of Employment At Will, I 7 AM. Bus. L.J. 
467 (1980); Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 
OHIO ST. L.J. I (1979); Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for 
a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481 (1976); Individual Rights in the Workplace: The At-Will Issue, 
supra note I; Note, Job Security for the At Will Employee: Contractual Rights of Discharge 
for Cause, 57 CHI. [-) KENT L. REV. 697 (1981). 
9. According to the Bureau of National Affairs survey of 400 major collective bargaining 
agreements, 990Jo of the contracts include voluntary grievance procedures. 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
NEGOTIATIONS & CONT. (BNA) 51:1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as BNA SURVEY). 
10. About 21 OJo of the labor force belongs to unions or employee associations. U.S. BUREAU 
OF LABOR STATISTICS, BULL. No. 2000, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 1978, at 507 (1979). 
Because collective bargaining agreements cover everyone in a bargaining unit, it is reasonable 
to assume that some nonunion members are also covered by the protection against unjust discharge 
found almost universally in collective agreements. 
11. BNA REPORT, supra note 5, at 3. The civilian labor force fluctuates in size but currently 
includes about 110 million persons. 
12. A review of many of the reported wrongful-dismissal cases brought in the last decade 
reveals that most plaintiffs were managers, supervisors, or administrators. The person who typified 
the average American employee (that is, one who had been employed in a job earning the median 
salary received by a full-time employed male ($ 379/week) or female ($ 248/week), see BUREAU 
OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, RELEASE No. 83-42, EARNINGS OF WORKERS AND 
THEIR FAMILIES: FOURTH QUARTER 1982, Table 4 (1982)), was grossly underrepresented. 
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the official United States position at the 1982 Conference of the ILO. 13 
Representatives from 126 countries voted in June 1982 on whether a 
Convention, "Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the 
Employer," should be adopted. 14 Representatives from only seven coun-
tries voted against adoption of such a Convention, 1 5 with the negative 
vote cast solely by the employers' representatives in six of these. The 
United States was the only country in the world whose government 
representative voted against the Convention. 
ILO standards undoubtedly have the widest effect in determining 
what is good industrial relations practice. Embodied in Conventions 
and Recommendations, these standards are deemed to be pronounce-
ments simply of what is acceptable, not of what is best practice. 16 The 
ILO follows this policy of setting standards of minimum acceptable 
behavior and of permitting flexible means of achieving the desired 
behavior because this is viewed as the only practical method of encourag-
ing member nations to respond voluntarily to the call for improvements 
in employment practices. 1 7 Hence, a country which fails to comply with 
ILO standards is not merely falling below some theoretical ideal: it 
is failing to come up to the minimum level of acceptable behavior. 
13. The International Labour Organisation was proposed in 1919 by a commission composed 
of representatives of employers, workers, and governments. Their proposal was included in a 
series of treaties following World War I. Surviving the demise of the League of Nations, the 
!LO became, a specialized agency of the United Nations in 1946 according to the principles set 
forth in the Declaration of Philadelphia, adopted May JO, 1944. On April 20, 1948, enough 
ratifications and acceptances had been registered to bring the present constitution into effect. 
All nations represented at the United Nations may belong to the !LO if they subscribe to the 
principles of freedom of expression and association. The !LO has a permanent office in Geneva, 
and a permanent secretariat. Each year, in June, delegates from the member nations meet and 
conduct business. This is called the International Labour Conference. See A. PEASLEE, 2 INTER-
NATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS 990-92 (rev. 3d ed. 1974). 
14. The final record vote on the Convention is found in the minutes of the June 22, 1982 
morning session. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, PROVISIONAL REC. OF THE SIXTY-
EIGHTH SESSION No. 36 (Thirty-first Sitting), at 14-16 (June 23, 1982) [hereinafter cited as SIXTY-
EIGHTH SESSIONJ. 
15. These countries were Brazil, Chile, Fiji, Grenada, Swaziland, Switzerland, and the United 
States. Id. at 16. 
16. At the annual meeting of the International Labour Conference, decisions in the form 
of conventions, recommendations, or resolutions may be taken. Two-thirds of the delegates pres-
ent and voting must support a proposed convention for it to be adopted. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR 
ORGANISATION CONST., art. 19(2). Each country has four voting delegates: two representing the 
government, and one each representing employers and working people. Id. art. 3, para. I. 
17. Once a convention has been adopted, all members are required to submit it to the ap-
propriate national authority for the enactment of legislation or other action within one year. 
If the national legislature consents to the ratification of the convention, the nation's formal ratifica-
tion of the convention is communicated to the Director-General of the !LO. Signatory nations 
assume an obligation to ensure that national law and practice comply with the provisions of 
the ratified convention. The !LO has no enforcement mechanism with which it can compel signatory 
nations to implement a convention. Periodically, the International Labour Office issues reports 
on compliance with a given convention. The information in these reports is, for the most part, 
supplied by the member nations. See id. art. 19, para. 5. 
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A. The /LO Convention 
The ILO Convention Concerning Termination of Employment at the 
Initiative of the Employer ("Convention") had its genesis in an ILO 
Recommendation on Termination of Employment adopted in 1963. 18 
Developments in national law and changes in national practice over 
the intervening twenty years prompted the International Labour Con-
ference to re-examine the 1963 Recommendation. It was felt that the 
advancement of worker rights in countries throughout the world made 
it an appropriate time to consider a Convention on the subject. 19 On 
June 22, 1982, the Sixty-eighth Conference approved both a Conven-
tion and a Recommendation on termination of employment. 20 Only 
the provisions of the Convention will be analyzed because it is the 
general concept of employment protection embodied in the Conven-
tion, not the specific Recommendation details, which is relevant to this 
discussion. 
1. Scope of protection- As its title indicates, the Convention covers 
not only individual discharge but also permanent layoffs affecting groups 
of workers. Consequently, only Parts I and II, dealing with individual 
discharge, will be discussed in this Article. It should be noted, however, 
that much of the controversy over the adoption of this Convention 
stemmed from employer resistance to protections granted under Part 
III which deals with termination of employment for economic, 
technological, or corporate structural reasons. 21 
18. A recommendation is drafted in much more specific language than a convention. In ef-
fect, the recommendation suggests in detail how the worker protections should be interpreted 
and applied. When the 1963 Recommendation on Termination of Employment was adopted in 
1963, it was thought that two-thirds of the delegates would not support a convention on this 
topic. The 1963 Recommendation is a direct forerunner of the 1982 Convention and much of 
the Convention's language is taken from the earlier Recommendation. The text of the 1963 Recom-
mendation is reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, 67TH SESSION, 1982: REPORT 
VIIJ(I) - TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT AT THE INITIATIVE OF THE EMPLOYER [EIGHTH ITEM ON 
THE AGENDA) 102-05 (1980). 
19. At its November 1979 session, the Governing Body of the International Labour Organisation 
decided to place an item on the agenda of the Sixty-seventh Session of the International Labour 
Conference entitled "Termination of employment at the initiative of the employer." On June 
22, 1981, the Conference resolved that this item would be placed on the agenda of the 1982 
Conference with a view towards adoption of a convention or a recommendation. INTERNATIONAL 
LABOUR CONFERENCE, 68TH SESSION, 1982: REPORT V(l) - TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT AT 
THE INJTJATTVE OF THE EMPLOYER [FIFTH ITEM ON THE AGENDA) I (1981). Employers favored 
the flexibility of a recommendation while worker representatives preferred a more binding con-
vention. Id. at 3-5. 
20. See SIXTY-EIGHTH SESSION, supra note 14, No. 36, at 14-16 (adopting Convention); id. 
(Thirty-second Sitting), at 19-21 (adopting Recommendation). The Recommendation is designed 
to provide further guidance on the meaning of the principles contained in the Convention and 
to suggest explicit standards capable of implementation. 
21. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, 67TH SESSION, 1982: REPORT VIll(2) - TER-
MINATION OF EMPLOYMENT AT THE INITIATIVE OF THE EMPLOYER [EIGHTH ITEM ON THE AGENDA] 
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Article I allows for alternative methods of giving effect to the Con-
vention, including legislation. 22 Whatever the method chosen, it must 
offer the comprehensive coverage required by Article 2 which states: 
''This Convention applies to all branches of economic activity and to 
all employed persons. " 23 The exceptions permitted under Article 2 are 
quite narrow, 24 and do not encompass the common exclusions in 
American employment law such as public sector employees, those 
employed in small businesses, supervisors, and managers. 25 
2. Substantive reasons for fair discharge- The keystone of the Con-
vention appears in Article 4 which provides that "[t]he employment 
of a worker shall not be terminated unless there is a valid reason for 
such termination connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker 
or based on the operational requirements of the undertaking, establish-
ment, or service." 26 This simple but forceful statement grants working 
people a guarantee of elemental fairness at the workplace. The employer 
may terminate employment, but not arbitrarily- or capriciously. The 
enactment of such a fundamental employee right would undermine the 
employment-at-will doctrine so widely used in the United States. This 
was explicitly recognized by the American government and employers' 
representatives who consistently opposed the adoption of Article 4. 27 
85-129 (1981) (listing questions on the proposed Convention and government replies) [hereinafter 
cited as REPORT VIII(2)]. The resistance of employers from certain countries, such as Britain, 
would be difficult to understand unless this fact is known because the home countries already 
complied completely with the unfair dismissal sections of the Convention. 
22. Under Article I, ratifying nations are not required to enact legislation to implement the 
Convention. Only if the protections specified are not already applicable by means of collective 
agreements, arbitration awards, court decisions, or other national practices must the ratifying 
nation enact legislation or promulgate regulations. See Convention, supra note 2, art. I. 
23. Id. art. 2(1 ). 
24. Under Article 2, persons on fixed-term contracts can be excluded, id. art. 2(2)(a), but 
ratifying nations are directed to ensure that this exclusion is not abused, id. art. 2(3). Persons 
serving a probationary period at the beginning of employment may also be excluded from certain 
parts of the Convention's protection. Id. art. 2(2)(b). 
It has been claimed that American employer_s won the right to have managers excluded from 
the coverage of the Convention. See BNA REPORT, supra note 5, at 15 (quoting Paul Weinberg, 
member of the American employers' delegation). Such an interpretation overstates the exclusion 
permitted by Article 2 that member nations may exclude "other limited categories" of employees 
where "special problems of a substantial nature" occur because of "particular conditions of 
employment" or the size or nature of the employer. Convention, supra note 2, art. 2(3). 
25. For example, the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. 
IV 1980), applies only to private sector employees and "employee" is defined by the Act to 
exclude supervisors, farm workers, and domestics, id. § 152(3). Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17-(1976 & Supp. IV 1980), dealing with equal employment 
opportunity, does not extend protection to those employed by employers having fewer than 15 
employees, id. § 2000e(b). 
26. Convention, supra note 2, art. 4. 
27. For instance, in 1982 the American government suggested that the clause be moved from 
the Convention to the Recommendation. See Report of the Committee on Termination of Employ-
ment, SIXTY-EIGHTH SESSION, supra note 14, No. 30, at 4 (June 19, 1982). The American employers' 
representative supported this amendment. Id. The United States ultimately abstained in the voting 
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The drafters were aware that this guarantee of just cause for discharge 
might be diluted by narrow interpretations given to the phrase "valid 
reasons for termination" in Article 4. To avoid this pitfall, they in-
cluded Article 5 which lists several reasons ratifying nations should 
not accept as a valid basis for termination. Among these were dismissal 
based on union activity or filing complaints against the employers with 
governmental bodies, or because of a worker's race, color, sex, na-
tional origin, or religion. 28 When the United States government was 
asked for its opinion in 1980 on this list of invalid reasons for termina-
tion, it did not quibble with any item on the list; it even suggested 
adding "handicap" to the list. 29 During the debates on the Conven-
tion, neither the American government nor the employers' represen-
tative objected to any specific item in the list. In addition, both argued 
that Article 4 should be deleted because Article 5 was, on its own, 
a sufficient guarantee against arbitrary discharges. 
This acquiescence and cooperation on the part of the American 
government and American employers' representatives was surprising 
because the list of reasons in Article 5, taken in conjunction with Arti-
cle 4's fundamental guarantee, covers items not yet found in American 
law. The Convention thus would provide significantly greater protec-
tion than that currently afforded American workers. For instance, 
although the substantive protection afforded by Article 5(a) and (b) 
is covered by section 8(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, the 
NLRA extends only to the private sector and only to that portion of 
the workforce defined as "employees" for the purposes of the Act. 30 
Admittedly, certain federal regulatory statutes protect those filing 
on the Recommendation. See id. No. 36 (Thirty-second Sitting), at 21. The primary spokesman 
for the American employers' group on this issue, Paul Weinberg of American Express, stated 
in the final debate preceding the vote that employers opposed the Convention, "basically because 
its very concept ... erodes the principle of termination at will." Id. No. 35 (Twenty-ninth 
Sitting), at 4 (June 22, 1982). 
28. The following, inter alia, shall not constitute valid reasons for termination: 
(a) union membership or participation in union activities outside working hours or, 
with the consent of the employer, within working hours; 
(b) seeking office as, or acting or having acted in the capacity of, a workers' 
represent;llive; 
(c) the filing of a complaint or the participation in proceedings against an employer 
involving alleged violation of laws or regulations or recourse to competent administrative 
authorities; 
(d) race, colour, sex, marital status, family responsibilities, pregnancy, religion, political 
opinion, national extraction or social origin; 
(e) absence from work during maternity leave. 
Convention, supra note 2, art. 5. 
29. See REPORT VIII(2), supra note 21, at 37. 
30. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. In addiiion to the statutory exclusions cited 
supra note 25, there are several judicially created exclusions from coverage, most notably for 
persons deemed to be rpanagerial employees. See, e.g., NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 
(1980) (college professors); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974) (salesmen). 
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charges against their employer under the statute, but this protection 
is hardly comprehensive. 31 In addition, like Article 5(d) of the Con-
vention, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects most American 
employees against discharge based on race, color, sex, pregnancy, 
religion, or national extraction. 32 Title VII, however, does not extend 
to discharge based on social origin (class), political opinion, family 
responsibilities, or marital status. 33 Finally, women absent from employ-
ment after childbirth are protected only to the extent that their absence 
is caused by a physical inability to return to work and then only if 
their employer's poli<::y on absence due to sickness includes such an 
absence. If the United States would implement Article 5 these wide 
gaps in the present protection afforded American workers would be 
filled. 
The Convention also addresses the important disciplinary issue of 
temporary absence from work because of injury or illness. Under Article 
6, such absences do not constitute a valid reason for termination. 34 
Article 6 refrains, however, from stipulating how long an employer 
must keep a job open for an ill employee; rather, the Convention leaves 
it to each ratifying nation to take into account national law and prac-
tice in deciding how this protection should be applied. 35 If the United 
States were to comply with Article 6, an area of substantial uncer-
tainty would be settled. Although it is generally accepted in the United 
States that a temporary absence should not give rise to discharge, there 
apparently exist no guidelines on employer practice in this area. 36 In 
seeking to ascertain how long a job will be kept open for an ill employee, 
research reveals that there are no set rules, or even strong employer 
norms. 37 The decision thus remains a unilateral determination by the 
employer, with non-union employees usually having no means of 
challenging a discharge based on absence. 
3. Procedural safeguards- The Convention supports the notion 
that discharged workers should have a right to def end themselves before 
punishment is imposed. Article 7 states that a dismissal based on the 
31. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1%4, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976 & Supp. 
IV 1980); see also National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. 
33. This assumes that the employer's policies are sex-blind, for instance that married women 
and men with children are treated similarly. See, e.g., Yuhas v. Libby-Owens-Ford Co., 562 
F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1977) (finding valid a company rule prohibiting employment of a married 
couple as long as couple given choice of which person should leave). 
34. Convention, supra note 2, art. 6(1). 
35. Id. art. 6(2). 
36. In response to a 1980 !LO survey, the United States agreed with the principle that tem-
porary absence dne to illness or injury should not be grounds for discharge. See REPORT Vlll(2), 
supra note 21, at 39. 
37. See BNA SURVEY, supra note 9, 62:6-7, 62:901 (discussing variations in sick-leave con-
tract provisions). 
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employee's conduct or performance should not take effect until the 
employee has had an opportunity to respond to the allegations, ''unless 
the employer cannot reasonably be expected to provide this 
opportunity." 38 This can be seen as merely good personnel manage-
ment practice. Yet, at present, there is no right to a pre-discharge 
disciplinary interview in the United States. 39 Besides preventing baseless 
discharges, Article 7 has another attraction: it alerts the employee to 
the reason for discharge, thereby permitting a defense to be prepared 
more easily. 
A critical aspect of the Convention's guarantee is contained in Arti-
cle 8 which provides that workers who believe they have been unfairly 
discharged should be able to challenge their discharge before an ''im-
partial body" such as a court, tribunal, or arbitrator. 40 Although Ar-
ticle 8 does not expressly mandate a hearing, the requirement that 
employees have a right to challenge their dismissal before an impartial 
body strongly implies that some type of hearing is contemplated. The 
United States government opposed any hearing requirement. It was 
displeased even with the moderately worded final form of Article 8 
because it believed that reliance on private dispute resolution mechanisms 
was preferable. 41 
The Convention also mitigates the difficult position in which the 
discharged worker is placed at a hearing by modifying the burden of 
proof. Article 9 bolsters the position of the employee by providing 
alternatives "[i]n order for the worker not to have to bear alone the 
burden of proving that the termination was not justified. " 42 The rati-
fying nation may either place the burden on the employer to come 
forward with a valid reason for the discharge, or require that the im-
partial body reach a conclusion based on the evidence, 43 thereby plac-
ing the burden of proof on neither party. 44 Far from being a matter 
38. Convention, supra note 2, art. 7. 
39. See, e.g., Brown, Limiting Your Risks in the New Russian Roulette-Discharging 
Employees, 8 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 380 (Winter 1982-83). In unionized companies, summary 
discharge is rare except in instances of egregious misconduct. In such companies, the practice 
of a pre-discharge investigation and interview may reflect employer awareness that arbitrators 
often take into account whether an employer gave a warning or conducted a pre-discharge in-
vestigation in determining whether the discharge was fair. 
40. Convention, supra note 2, art. 8(1). 
41. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, PROVISIONAL RECORD OF THE SIXTY-SEVENTH 
SESSION No. 39 (Thirty-first Sitting), at 24 (June 23, 1981) [hereinafter cited as SIXTY-SEVENTH 
SESSION]. 
42. Convention, supra note 2, art. 9(2). 
43. Id. 
44. The original draft of the proposed Convention had placed the burden of proof on the 
employer. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, 68TH SESSION, 1982: REPORT V(2) -
TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT AT THE INITIATIVE OF THE EMPLOYER [FIFrH ITEM ON THE AGENDA] 
70 (proposed text). The employers' representatives vigorously opposed this, and the Committee 
on Termination of Employment devised the compromise which appears in the adopted Conven-
tion. See BNA REPORT, supra note 5, at 15 (statement of Paul Weinberg). 
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of mere procedure, this requirement amounts to an important substan-
tive protection in itself: employees are no longer placed in the difficult 
position of proving that the employer's reason for discharge was in-
valid, a task usually requiring employees to prove that their work record 
was spotless. Article 9 thus creates further support for the fundamen-
tal guarantee. Employers should have a valid reason for dismissal; 
therefore, it is not unduly onerous to require employers to specify that 
reason. 
Preferring voluntary, private arrangements to mandatory unfair-
dismissal procedures, the United States government proposed that the 
requirements of Articles 8 and 9 be placed in the non-binding Recom-
mendation, rather than in the Convention, to provide nations with "con-
siderable flexibility" in the means of implementing the Convention. 45 
The Article 9 provision that the employer be required to come for-
ward with a valid reason for an employee's dismissal was specifically 
criticized by an American employers' advisor as one of the major areas 
in which the Convention severely curtailed the flexibility employers 
believe they must have to control their operations. 46 
B. American Position on the /LO Convention 
An examination of the voting on the Convention reveals the isola-
tion of the United States from other highly industrialized, free coun-
tries. The Convention's strongest supporters were countries whose 
government, employers' and workers' representatives all voted in favor 
of the Convention, such as Canada, West Germany, France, and 
Japan. 47 Strong support also came from countries such as the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands where, though the employers' represent-
atives abstained to signal disapproval with Part III of the Convention, 
support for the unfair-dismissal parts was nevertheless total. 48 In only 
three Western, highly industrialized countries, did support for unfair-
dismissal protection fall below the level of strong support: Australia, 
Switzerland, and the United States. Not surprisingly, workers' represen-
tatives from all three countries voted in favor of the Convention. Both 
the Australian government representatives and employers' representative 
abstained. The Swiss government representatives voted in favor, while 
the employers' representative voted against. The American government 
representative and employers' representative both voted against the Con-
45. SIXTY-SEVENTH SESSION, supra note 41 at 24. 
46. Id. (statement of Mr. Weinberg). 
47. See SIXTY-EIGHTH SESSION, supra note 14, No. 36, at 14-16. Other industrialized countries 
in this group were Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Norway, and Sweden. Id. 
48. See id. at 16. Other Western industrialized countries voting similarly were Austria, Den-
mark, Greece, Luxembourg, and Portugal. Id. 
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vention. No other country in the world displayed such official rejec-
tion of the Convention. 49 
The American government's reasons for voting against the Conven-
tion are noteworthy. As mentioned, many of the employers' represen-
tatives, who otherwise approved of much of the Convention, voted 
against its adoption or abstained because of the proposed restraints 
on the employer's ability to dismiss workers incident to a plant closure 
or manpower reduction. so The United States, however, was the only 
major nation opposing the Convention to take an official position during 
the debates which struck at the Convention's essential core concept 
of just cause for discharge. st It objected to the Convention because 
of the mandatory nature of certain substantive provisions, because 
employers were required to have a valid reason for discharging an 
employee, and because of the required post-discharge appeal to an im-
partial body with the employer asked to put forward some reason for 
discharge. s2 
Although ILO Conventions cannot be legally enforced against member 
nations, most Western, industrialized nations do take seriously their 
obligations as ratifying nations. s3 Moreover, developing countries often 
look to ILO Conventions when attempting to upgrade national industrial 
relations practices and employment standards. These factors may have 
prompted American employers to take a more vigorous stance in oppos-
ing this Convention which they knew would not be ratified by the United 
States. s4 Apparently, many American companies did not want to be 
required by law to behave at home as they must abroad. The presence 
of unfair-dismissal legislation, however, does not seem to be a disincen-
tive to corporate investment. For instance, more American companies 
operate in Great Britain than in any other foreign country, yet British 
law on unfair dismissal completely complies with the requirements of 
49. See id. 
50. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
51. The United States has ratified only seven Conventions, all dealing with maritime matters. 
The American government has taken the position that the federal legislature is without the power 
to bind the states in matters covered by Conventions. This has not, however, prevented the United 
States from supporting Conventions and voting in favor of their adoption; hence, the vigorous 
opposition of the United States to the Convention is significant. 
52. See SIXTY-EIGHTH SESSION, supra note 14, No. 35, at 4-5; see also U.S. Council, Termina-
tion of Employment, INT'L LAB. AFF. REP., 1982, No. 3, at 5. 
53. For example, the United Kingdom has ratified more than 80 ILO conventions and most 
European nations have ratified more than 50. The United States has ratified only seven. 
54. See, e.g., U.S. Council, supra note 52, at 4-6 (U.S. Council for International Business 
urging its member companies to notify their overseas subsidiaries about the content of the new 
Convention so that an appropriate lobbying effort at national level can be made); BNA REPORT, 
supra note 5, at 14 (quoting a letter from Paul Weinberg, lead American employers' advisor 
on the Convention, to the chairman of the industrial relations committee of the U.S. Council 
for International Business, citing the potential impact on overseas subsidiaries as a major reason 
for making every effort to block the adoption of a Convention). 
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the new ILO Convention. 
II. BRITISH LAW AND PRACTICE 
When a country has gone without any protection against unfair 
dismissal for a considerable period of time, the reasons why it decides 
to grant a right of fair dismissal, particularly in light of the cost of 
enforcing such a right, are illuminating. In Britain's case, there were 
two major reasons. First, it was accepted that Britain should take ac-
tion to comply with the standards promulgated by the ILO. 55 Second, 
it was widely believed that the lack of peaceful dispute-resolution 
mechanisms in discharge cases led to work stoppages. 56 Because both 
views commanded non-partisan support, it was not surprising that 
Parliament promptly acted on the idea of granting a right to fair 
dismissal. The process was expedited by tacking unfair-dismissal pro-
visions onto major, comprehensive industrial relations legislation already 
proposed. 
Effective enforcement of this new protection was easily guaranteed 
through the use of a special system of tribunals set up to provide ac-
cessible, inexpensive, and quick resolution to discharge cases. This would 
free the regular comt system from the potential clogging effect of an 
unfair-dismissal caseload. Furthermore, it would relieve complaints 
about the burden of utilizing regular court procedures, an expensive 
and time-consuming process likely to daunt discharged workers. Unifor-
mity in the development of the law would be provided by appellate 
courts. 
A. Pressures for Legislative Action 
Britain did not enact legislation on unfair dismissal until 1971. 
American workers today would be familiar with the situation prevail-
ing in Britain prior to that time. There was no statutory or judicially 
created right to fair dismissal. Neither were there any governmentally 
supported procedures enabling employees to protest their dismissal. 57 
An employee who was dismissed could sue for breach of contract in 
the regular civil courts, but without an express contractual clause on 
fair treatment, such litigation was unlikely to be successful. Employers 
were required to provide each employee with a written employment 
contract containing terms covering specified items, such as the notice 
55. See WmTE PAPER ON INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, CMD. No. 2548, at 6-8 (1964). 
56. See infra note 61 and accompanying text. 
57. For example, there was no government mediation service. 
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period under the Contracts of Employment Act of 1963. 58 This "pro-
tection," however, did not significantly improve the position of 
employees. Most employees worked under a contract with an indefinite 
term, and an employer wishing to dismiss such an employee merely 
had to give proper notice of termination for the dismissal to be lawful. 59 
No reason for terminating the contract was required for these dismissals. 
Private methods of resolving disagreements in discharge cases were 
unusual. Although the rate of unionization was much higher in Bri-
tain than in the United States, 60 and despite the fact that the union 
movement was very strong, arbitration as a means of resolving 
disagreements over the validity of individual dismissals had not 
developed to any measurable extent. If the discharged person's co-
workers were sufficiently dissatisfied with the basis for the discharge, 
the shop steward would approach management in an effort to work 
out a satisfactory solution. If these efforts failed, workers would typi-
cally threaten, and if necessary, actually engage in, an immediate work 
stoppage. To persuade the strikers to resume working, management 
would often enter into some form of negotiation and take_ some action 
to resolve the crisis. This method of resolving discharge disputes ac-
corded great weight to the work group's sense of fairness and solidar-
ity, and it undoubtedly offered very prompt remedial action without 
government intervention. Aside from these positive features, however, 
there were some distinct disadvantages to this method of dispute 
resolution. 61 Short, unannounced work stoppages by small groups of 
workers caused not only an immediate loss of production but also a 
decline in the overall reputation of British firms for timely performance. 
In addition, if the discharged person's work group lacked strike power, 
there was, for all practical purposes, no way to challenge the discharge. 
58. Ch. 49. This was significantly amended by the Contracts of Employment Act, 1972, ch. 
53. The written statement had to be given to the employee within the first 13 weeks of employ-
ment. Id. 
59. At present, the notice period varies from one to 12 weeks depending upon the employee's 
length of service with the company. See Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978, ch. 
44, § 49(1). The statute sets the minimum notice; the contract may increase the notice period. 
An employer wishing to terminate an employee immediately can fulfill its contractual obligations 
by paying the employee the amount the employee would have earned during the notice period. 
Id. §§ 50-51 & Sched. 3. 
60. It has been estimated that in 1970, 38% of white-collar employees and 52.7% of blue-
collar employees in Great Brita_in were union members. See Bain & Price, Union Growth and 
Employment Trends in the U.K., /964-1970, 10 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 366, 378 (1972). In the 
United States, 27.3% of the nonagricultural labor force were union members in 1970. The figure 
went up to 300/o if persons belonging to associations, such as the National Educational Associa-
tion, were counted as members. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, BULL. 2079, DIRECTORY 
OF NATIONAL UNIONS AND EMPLOYEE ASSOCIATIONS, 1979-59 (1980). See also Freeman & Medoff, 
New Estimates of Private Sector Unionism in the United States, 32 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 
143 (1979). 
61. See McCarthy, The Nature of Britain's Strike Problem, 8 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 224, 235-36 
(1970). 
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This state of affairs changed in 1964 when the British government 
announced that it had accepted and would conform to the 1963 Recom-
mendation on Termination of Employment that had been adopted by 
the ILO the previous year. 62 The government then formally consulted 
employers' and employees' groups on how to provide effective 
safeguards against unfair dismissal. A committee of the Minister of 
Labour's National Joint Advisory Council studied existing practices 
and issued its report in 1967.63 The committee's findings depicted a 
situation similar to that now existing in the United States. The report 
noted that, in general, employees had no legal protection against 
dismissal for bad reasons or for no reason at all. 64 The committee found 
that formal personnel policies covering dismissal procedures were not 
widespread, with those in existence found mostly in larger firms. 65 In 
unionized companies, disputes procedures were agreed upon and could 
be utilized in discharge disputes, but the committee observed that their 
comprehensiveness and effectiveness varied greatly. 66 
While this committee was studying the issue of protection against 
unfair dismissal, another government committee was touching upon 
the same topic as part of a wide-ranging inquiry. In 1965, the Royal 
Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations, commonly 
called_ the Donovan Commission, was established to consider the whole 
field of labor-management relations with a particular focus on the law 
affecting labor relations. 67 The work of the Donovan Commission re-
ceived substantial publicity and, unlike the National Joint Advisory 
Committee's report, its recommendations were designed for legislative 
implementation. 
In its 1968 Report, the Donovan Commission found unsatisfactory 
the then-existing situation whereby protection against unfair dismissal 
existed only at the employer's discretion. 68 Whereas the National Joint 
Advisory Committee had refrained from recommending statutory pro-
tection against unfair dismissal, a majority of the Donovan Commis-
62. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
63. See MINISTRY OF LABOUR, DISMISSAL PROCEDURES (H.M.S.O. 1967). 
64. Id. para. 13. 
65. Id. paras. 69, 72. 
66. Id. para. 72. 
67. The establishment of the Donovan Commission was prompted by the conviction that 
the government should act to improve the system of industrial relations then generally perceived 
to be in trouble. Whether this public perception was accurate has been disputed. Compare McCar-
thy, supra note 61, at 235-36 (arguing that there was a substantial problem), with Turner, Is 
Britain Really Strike Prone?: A Review of the Incidence, Character and Costs of Industrial Con-
flict, Occasional Paper No. 20 (Cambridge Univ. Press May 1969) (claiming that the strike prob-
lem was exaggerated), cited in McCarthy, supra note 61, at 224 n.l. After a thorough examina-
tion of the statistical evidence, one author concluded that Lord McCarthy was correct. See Silver, 
Recent British Strike Trends: A Factual Analysis, 11 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 66, 94-98 (1973). 
68. ROYAL COMM'N ON TRADE UNIONS AND EMPLOYERS' Ass'Ns 1965-1968, REPORT, CMD. 
No. 3623, para. 526 (1968). 
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sion concluded that statutory protection was the desirable response to 
this situation. 69 To support their conclusion, the Commission observed: 
"[i]f statutory protection is to be afforded against arbitrary dismis~al 
when the reason for it happens to be race or colour, then protection 
should be afforded against dismissal for other no • less arbitrary 
reason. mo The primary advantage of a statutory guarantee, in the Com-
mission's opinion, was "an immediate raising of standards to a much 
more satisfactory level." 11 
B. Implementing Statutory Protection 
The Donovan Report generated intense controversy; both the Labour 
Party and the Conservative Party proposed remedial labor legislation 
varying on most major issues. The sole exception was protection against 
unfair dismissal which was quickly implemented in the Industrial Rela-
tions Act, 1971. 12 Section 22 of that Act declared: "[i]n every employ-
ment to which this section applies every employee shall have the right 
not to be unfairly dismissed by his employer. " 73 Reflecting the volatility 
of British labor relations, labor legislation in Britain since 1971 has 
not been stable. Acts have been passed, then repealed, and the repeal-
ing legislation itself has been extensively amended. 7 4 This notwithstand-
ing, the unfair-dismissal protection, now codified in the Employment 
Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978, 75 stands unchanged after twelve 
years, 76 a tribute to its enduring popularity and effectiveness. 
The British legislation set forth in Part V of the Employment Pro-
tection (Consolidation) Act provides Americans with a practical lesson 
69. See id. paras. 533-544. The minority believed that voluntary procedures should be improved. 
This same difference of opinion had caused the representatives from the Confederation of British 
Industry and those from the Trades Union Congress to deadlock a year earlier. See id. ~ 531. 
70. Id. para. 543. 
71. Id. para. 539. 
72. Ch. 72. 
73. Id. § 22. In Britain, the term "wrongful dismissal" means that an employee has been 
dismissed by an employer who has failed to comply in some way with the terms of the employ-
ment contract. The term "unfair dismissal" covers a much broader spectrum of employer con-
duct. In alleging unfair dismissal, employees need not base their arguments on a clause in the 
employment contract. See Engineering Employers' Federation, Industrial Relations Bill: Ques-
tions and Answers for Management 8 (Mar. 1971). 
74. The Industrial Relations Act, 1971, ch. 72, enacted under a Conservative government, 
was repealed by the Labour government with the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 1974, 
ch. 52. The subsequent Conservative government has extensively amended the latter statute with 
the Employment Act, 1980, ch. 42, and the Employment Act, 1982, ch. 46. 
75. Ch. 44. Parts of statutes which dealt with employment protection matters, such as unfair 
dismissal, maternity benefit, and redundancy payments, were consolidated into one statute. Most 
of the 1978 Act was taken from the Employment Protection Act, 1975, ch. 71. 
76. When the Industrial Relations Act, 1971, was repealed by the incoming Labour govern-
ment in 1974, only the sections on unfair dismissal were re-enacted. See Trade Union and Labour 
Relations Act, 1974, ch. 52, sched. I, pt. II. 
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in implementing safeguards against unfair dismissal. An affirmatively 
stated employee right, appropriately limited grounds for discharge, com-
prehensive coverage, a burden of proof not placed exclusively on the 
employee, and impartial appeal tribunals all combine to render the 
British legislation in compliance with the new ILO Convention on Ter-
mination of Employment. 77 
1. The guarantee- After guaranteeing the employee a right not 
to be dismissed unfairly, the statute specifies valid reasons for discharge. 
Section 57(2) states that the reason must be related to the employee's 
conduct, qualifications, or capability to perform the work, 78 or that 
there must be "some other substantial reason of a kind such as to 
justify the dismissal of an employee holding the position which the 
employee held. " 79 Section 57 lists the generally applicable considera-
tions in a discharge case. Other sections deal with dismissals relating 
to union membership, union activism, pregnancy, and maternity leave. 80 
Dismissal based on race and sex are outlawed by other, specialized 
statutes, but are mentioned in Part V of the Employment Protection 
(Consolidation) Act so that the issue of compensation in a discrimina-
tion case can be considered. 81 
2. Burden of proof- Although technically a matter of procedure, 
the placement of the burden of proof in a discharge case fundamentally 
affects the substantive guarantee provided employees in unfair-dismissal 
legislation. 82 Amended several times, the current burden of proof sec-
tion requires the tribunal, in deciding whether the dismissal was fair, 
to consider the reason given by the employer for the discharge. 83 
Tribunals must decide whether the employer acted reasonably in treating 
77. This statement refers only to Parts I and II of the Convention. See supra note 21 all 
and accompanying text. 
78. Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978, ch. 44, § 57(2)(a), (b). Subsection 
(c) deals with redundancy. 
79. Id. § 57(1)(b). 
80. For each of these reasons, there is a qualifying period an employee must have served 
before a claim can be made. Some attach immediately, such as race and sex discrimination. 
The all-purpose claim, under section 57, however, requires the longest qualifying period. See 
id. § 64. 
81. See id. § 76. 
82. It is generally thought that placing the burden of proof on the employer makes it easier 
for employees to win claims. Hence, Labour governments have favored placing the entire burden 
on the employer while Conservative governments have opposed this. 
83. Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978, ch. 44, § 57(3), amended by Employ-
ment Act, 1980, § 6. The section states in part: 
[T]he determination of the question whether the dismissal was fair or unfair, having 
regard to the reason shown by the employer, shall depend on whether in the circumstances 
(including the size and administrative resources of the employer's undertaking) the 
employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismis-
sing the employee; and that question shall be determined in accordance with equity 
and the substantial merits of the case. 
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the proffered reason as sufficient grounds for discharge. 84 
Employers previously were required to satisfy the tribunal that they 
had acted reasonably. 85 Now, the burden on the employer is something 
less than the conventional burden of proof, yet the burden is not shifted 
to the employee to prove that the dismissal was unfair. 86 In this regard, 
the British legislation remains in compliance with the ILO Convention. 87 
Importantly, the employer is still required to come forward at the hear-
ing with the reason for the discharge. The British practice, therefore, 
places discharged persons in a very different and less onerous position 
than their American counterparts who must, as plaintiffs, prove that 
the em.ployer breached the employment contract. 
3. Coverage- Protection under the British statute is comprehen-
sive; nearly all full-time employees are protected against unfair dismissal 
once with a company for some requisite period - generally, one year 
of service. 88 In firms with less than twenty employees, employees are 
not protected until they have accumulated two years of service with 
the company. 89 Probationary periods of employment are thus accepted, 
and until they expire and statutory protection vests, employers retain 
the right to dismiss new employees at will. 90 Persons employed under 
fixed-term contracts may also be protected, depending on the term of 
their contracts. When the contract of a person employed for a fixed 
term expires without being renewed, that person can complain of un-
fair dismissal only if the contractual term was for more than one year. 9 ' 
84. If there was more than one reason that motivated the employer to dismiss the claimant, 
the tribunal decides whether the principal reason was sufficient. See id. § 57(1). 
85. The 1978 Act imposed this requirement. See id. It was amended by the 1980 Act. See 
supra note 83. 
86. See supra note 83. 
87. See Convention, supra note 2, art. 9. 
88. Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978, ch. 44, § 64. The requisite period 
had been 26 weeks since 1974. See Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 1974, ch. 52, sched. 
I, pt. II, para. IO. It was lengthened by the Conservative government in 1979 to limit the numbers 
of dismissed workers who could make a claim. See Unfair Dismissal (Variation of Qualifying 
Period) Order, 1979 STAT. INST. No. 959. Part-time employees are those who usually work less 
than 16 hours per week. 
89. Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978, ch. 44, § 64A, amended by Employ-
ment Act, 1980, .ch. 42, § 8(2). 
90. Both political parties accept the validity of a probationary period but differ on how long 
this period should be. It has been asserted that many workers in high turnover industries are 
effectively excluded from protection by a one-year probationary period. See R. LEWIS & B. SIMP-
SON, STRIKING A BALANCE? EMPLOYMENT LAW AFTER THE 1980 ACT 27 (1981). See also infra 
note 81 and accompanying text. 
91. See Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978, ch. 44, §§ 55(2)(b), 142(1), amended 
by Employment Act, 1980, ch. 42, § 8(2). In some European countries, such as France, it is 
common for certain employees, such as secretaries, to be employed for years under short-term 
contracts which automatically renew unless either party gives notice. Because this practice is not 
common in Britain, these statutory sections have not been subject to frequent use. In addition, 
British employers have not attempted to circumvent the unfair dismissal protections by placing 
employees on short, fixed-term contracts. 
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Aside from these service requirements, the exclusions from coverage 
are quite narrow. 92 There is no public sector /private sector distinction, 
nor is there any general exemption for small employers. Persons who 
normally work outside Great Britain93 and those employed by their 
spouse94 are not protected. Finally, persons over normal retirement age 
are not covered by the statute. 95 
4. Remedies- In formulating remedies, the British adopted a 
pragmatic approach. The intent was not to inflict serious pecuniary 
damage on companies, but solely to compensate employees fairly for 
their loss and to provide a sufficient financial disincentive to employers. 
The remedy for unfair dismissal is either reinstatement or re-
employment, if the complainant so desires and the tribunal believes 
it is appropriate, or a damages award. 96 Reinstatement to the former 
position or re-employment in another job with the same employer, 
though permitted under the statute, is not common. 97 In most cases, 
compensation is the remedy. 98 This may result from the widely held 
belief that persons who have been discharged will not easily fit back 
in their former workplace and that, in most instances, new employ-
ment elsewhere is better for all concerned. 99 In this regard, it should 
be noted that seniority is not nearly as important a factor in British 
employment as it is in the United States. 100 
The damages award has two components: a "basic" award and a 
"compensatory" award. 101 The basic award is computed according to 
a statutory formula which takes into account the complainant's length 
of service, weekly pay, and age. The statute places a maximum limit 
on the basic award, which, in effect, is a liquidated damages provision. 102 
92. Seamen, dockworkers, and persons employed by police departments are not covered by 
the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, but they are protected against unfair dismissal 
under industry-specific legislation and regulations. Id. §§ 144, 145, 146(2). 
93. Id. § 141. 
94. Id. § 146(1). 
95. Id. § 64(1)(b). The normal retirement age for men is 65; for women, 60. Id. The Act 
contains an exception to this rule: if a person over retirement age is dismissed for an "inadmis-
sible" principal reason, the Act applies. See id. § 64(3). 
96. Id. § 68. 
97. See Dickens, Hart, Jones & Weekes, Re-employment of Unfairly Dismissed Workers: 
The Lost Remedy, 10 !Nous. L.J. 160 (1981); Williams & Lewis, Legislating for Job Security: 
The British Experience of Reinstatement and Reengagement, 8 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 482 (Winter 
1982-83). 
98. Dickens, Hart, Jones & Weekes, supra note 97, at 161. 
99. See id. at 163-66. Based on a field study, the authors questioned the accuracy of this 
assumption. 
100. For example, length of vacation and selection order for shifts, overtime, and vacation 
are not usually based on seniority in Great Britain. Lay-offs, however, are usually done on a 
"last-in, first-out" basis. 
101. Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978, ch. 44, § 72. 
102. At the time the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act was passed, the average 
wage for a full-time male worker was £5200 (about $10,000). The statute set the maximum basic 
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Section 74 states that the compensatory award be "such amount as 
the tribunal considers just and equitable in all the circumstances hav-
ing regard to the loss sustained by the complainant in consequence 
of the dismissal so far as that loss is attributable to action taken by 
the employer." 103 In deciding whether to make a compensatory award, 
and what amount to award, 104 the tribunal may take into account the 
extent to which the complainant caused or contributed to the loss. 105 
The compensatory award is designed to cover expenses, financial loss, 
and other items. Where appropriate, emotional distress and injury to 
feelings may be compensated. The compensatory award, however, was 
not designed to be a windfall. When enacted, the statutory maximum 
amount allowed as a compensatory award was pegged at the average 
yearly salary of the full-time male industrial worker. 106 
5. Complaints procedure- One of the most attractive features of 
the British legislation is a complaints procedure designed to minimize 
legalistic formality and to resolve cases with finality at the earliest possi-
ble stage. Persons who believe that they have been unfairly dismissed 
may file a complaint under the statute. Complaint forms, which are 
available at local offices of the Department of Employment, must be 
filed within three months of the discharge. 107 After the complaint is 
filed, an employee of the independent government agency, the Advisory, 
Conciliation and Arbitration Service ("ACAS"), will meet with the 
complainant and the employer and attempt to secure agreement to a 
conciliated ,settlement. The efforts of the ACAS conciliation officer 
are an integral part of the statutory plan. 108 On average, about sixty 
percent of complaints are disposed of at the conciliation stage, either 
because a conciliated settlement was reached or because the complain-
ant withdrew the claim. 109 The remaining forty percent of claims pro-
award possible at £3000 and the maximum compensatory award (in normal dismissal claims under 
section 57) at £5200. See id. §§ 73-75, sched. 14, sec. 8(1). The maximum award has recently 
been increased to £7500. See 1982 STAT. INST. No. 1868. 
103. Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978, ch. 44, § 74(1). 
104. The compensatory award must be reduced by the amount the complainant has earned 
or would have earned had the complainant taken reasonable efforts to mitigate the loss. Id. § 74(4). 
105. See s. ANDERMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR DISMISSAL 212 (1978). 
106. Using this formula and supplying U.S. figures, the U.S. equivalent would be about $19,700, 
based on weekly median earnings of $379 for full-time employed men. See BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, supra note 12, Table 4. 
107. Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978, ch. 44, § 67(2). 
108. In 1979, the Conservative government further emphasized this role by introducing a 
pre-hearing assessment stage. R. LEWIS & B. SIMPSON, supra note 90, at 58. 
109. See Hoffman, Mediation of Unfair Dismissal Grievances: The British Example, 32 PROC. 
ANN. MEETING INDUS. REL. RESEARCH Assoc. 171, 173-74 (1979). The figures are approximate; 
an average would be misleading because the qualifying service period changed from two years 
to 26 weeks to one year during the 1970's. During the period when protection attached after 
six months on the job, the number of claims and the number of claimants withdrawing cases 
rose significantly. For 1980 statistics, see Lewis, Ten Years of unfair dismissal legislation in Great 
Britain, 121 INT'L LAB. REV. 713, 716 (1982). 
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ceed to a hearing. 110 
C. Unfair-Dismissal Hearings 
Unfair-dismissal complaints are heard by industrial tribunals, which 
are tripartite bodies functioning as labor courts. 111 The chairman is 
an experienced barrister or solicitor. 1 12 One wingman comes from the 
ranks of employers' associations, the other from the unions. 113 The 
two wingmen are not expected to act as advocates for their side; rather, 
they serve as independent, uncommitted lay judges experienced in in-
dustrial relations matters. 114 
Hearings before industrial tribunals are designed to be informal, and 
the chairman is expected to assist persons unfamiliar with the process. 
Representation by lawyers is not typical at these hearings, though some 
larger companies routinely use lawyers to represent them. Employers 
are often represented by a personnel manager. Complainants may bring 
along a shop steward or other union officer, or a friend. Tribunal hear-
ings are short, with most lasting one day or less. Pre-hearing briefs 
are not known as such, although a written statement of one or two 
pages is sometimes submitted to clarify the issues in a complicated case. 
Post-hearing briefs are unknown. In keeping with the public polfoy 
of resolving dismissal cases quickly and cheaply, decisions of industrial 
tribunals, tend to be short. Attempts to move the system into a more 
formal, legalistic mode have been resisted. 11 s 
1. Appeals- The losing party may appeal the decision of an m-
110. See Hoffman, supra note 109, at 173-74. 
Ill. See id. at 173. See generally K. WEDDERBURN & P. DAVIES, EMPLOYMENT GRIEVANCES 
AND DISPUTES PROCEDURES IN BRITAIN 243-57 (1969). 
112. The law profession in Great Britain is bifurcated. Broadly speaking, barristers practice 
exclusively as litigators and appellate advocates. Barristers receive their "brief" from solicitors, 
lawyers who practice outside the courtroom. The demarcation line has blurred recently, with 
both groups permitted to appear before tribunals and the lowest level of criminal court. 
113. Non-lawyers are selected to serve on industrial tribunals by the Secretary of State for 
Employment from lists of names submitted by various groups, such as employers' associations 
and trade unions. These lay persons do not receive full-time appointments. See K. WEDDERBURN 
& P. DAVIES, supra note 111, at 247-49. 
114. The complainant and respondent in a given case have no control over the composition 
of their particular panel. That is determined as an administrative task by the Central Office 
of Industrial Tribunals. Assignments to hear particular cases are made on a random basis; no 
effort is made to match up the industry background of the wingmen with the industrial setting 
of the case. Overall this has a beneficial effect because it ensures that general workplace norms 
are applied in determining fairness rather than notions specific to one industry. 
115. See, e.g., Retarded Children's Aid Soc'y Ltd. v. Day, 1978 Indus. Cas. R. 437 (declin-
ing to overturn a tribunal decision even though a determination on a relevant issue did not ap-
pear in the decision). In his separate opinion, Lord Russell of Killowen emphasized that "care 
must be taken to avoid concluding that an experienced industrial tribunal by not expressly men-
tioning some point or breach has overlooked it." Id. at 444. See generally K. WEDDERBURN 
& P. DA VIES, supra note I I I, at 258-75. The process may be becoming more formalized, however, 
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dustrial tribunal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal.' 16 Approximately 
four percent of industrial tribunal decisions are appealed.1" Divisions 
(panels) of the Employment Appeal Tribunal are also tripartite bodies, 
with the chairman a High Court judge. The Employment Appeal 
Tribunal reviews only questions of law, though there is some debate 
as to whether the main issue in unfair-dismissal cases is a question 
of law or fact. 1 ' 8 The Employment Appeal Tribunal, in the interest 
of having industrial tribunals throughout the country apply uniform 
standards, has indicated that it believes the issue of whether an employer 
acted reasonably in dismissing is a question of law. 119 For instance, the 
fairness of dismissal for any given offense, such as repeated tardiness 
due to transportation difficulties, is considered a question of law, not 
fact. How these general standards of fairness apply to a given case, 
however, is a question of fact. 
Although a judgment of the Employment Appeal Tribunal may be 
appealed to the Court of Appeal, and from there to the House of Lords, 
higher appeals are unusual. 120 This may stem from the posture of the 
Court of Appeal which has tended to back the decisions of industrial 
tribunals quite strongly, to the point of insulating them from review 
by the Employment Appeal Tribunal. It has done so in the belief ''that 
Parliament intended industrial tribunals to resolve dismissal disputes 
in a quick, cheap and informal manner, without resort to legal 
refinements, and this policy will be undermined if tribunal decisions 
are too closely scrutinised." 121 Current American experience certainly 
supports the Court of Appeal's view that time-consuming, multi-stage 
appeals add little to the determination of the initial factfinder and greatly 
detract from the efficacy of the eventual remedy to the employee. 
2. Interpretation of the guarantee- Any guarantee of fair dismissal 
requires the trier of fact to determine what standards of fairness should 
control. In determining whether the employer acted fairly in discharg-
ing the complainant, tribunals take into consideration the rulings of 
appellate courts and the factors mentioned in the Industrial Relations 
simply because legal representation is becoming more common. See Lewis, supra note 109, at 
722-23. 
116. Under the Industrial Relations Act, 1971, ch. 72, appeal was made to the National In-
dustrial Relations Court. When this court was abolished by the Trade Union and Labour Rela-
tions Act, 1974, ch. 52, appeal was made to the High Court. The Employment Appeal Tribunal 
was substituted by the Employment Protection Act, 1975, ch. 71. 
117. See Phillips, Some Notes on the Employment Appeal Tribunal, 7 INDus. L.J. 137, 141 
(1978). 
118. See, e.g., Elias, Fairness in Unfair Dismissal: Trends and Tensions, 10 INDUS. L.J. 201, 
203 (1981). 
I 19. One High Court judge has noted that "it needs to be remembered that cases of dismissal 
can be categorised, and that the controversial questions soon become familiar." Phillips, supra 
note 117, at 139. 
120. Hoffman, supra note 109, at 174. 
121. Elias, supra note 118, at 209 & n.40 (citing cases). 
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Code of Practice and the ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary Prac-
tice and Procedures. 122 In addition to explaining the meaning of the 
statutory guarantee in a practical way, these Codes discuss what con-
stitutes good industrial relations practice; for instance, that a warning 
normally should be given prior to discharge. Not surprisingly, this 
general advice has not been sufficient to ~nswer the numerous, recur-
ring questions which arise in dismissal cases. 
To avoid having tribunal members asking how they would have acted 
in the circumstances, the House of Lords has emphasized that the 
tribunal must determine whether the employer acted reasonably in light 
of the circumstances as they appeared to that employer at the time 
of the dismissal. 123 In making this determination, British tribunals and 
courts take the attitude that the statute obliges the employer to act 
as the reasonable employer would have acted in the circumstances. As 
a result, the decisions of tribunals have become a body of law detail-
ing the bounds of fairness in disciplinary situations. 
The British tribunal approaches the issue of whether an employer 
acted fairly somewhat differently than an American arbitrator in a union 
setting approaches the question of whether an employer had just cause 
to discharge. 124 In Britain, the limitations on the employer's right to 
discharge flow from the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 
which applies equally to all employers in all industries. Consequently, 
greater weight is accorded societal norms relating to the reasonableness 
of a given disciplinary response than is given to the actual fairness 
of the respondent employer, who may consistently apply more stringent 
discipline than the norm. 125 The British experience should therefore 
caution the drafters of any American legislation on unfair dismissal 
to take into account the orientation of the trier of fact in deciding 
the issue of fairness. The attitudes of American labor arbitrators, reflect-
ing the context of very individualized bargaining on discipline, should 
not color the application of any generalized American guarantee of 
fair dismissal; otherwise, the guarantee itself will be diluted. 126 
122. Although not statutes, codes of practice are approved by Parliament and may be in-
troduced in court proceedings as evidence of good industrial relations practice. See P. ELIAS, 
8. NAPIER & P. WALLINGTON, LABOUR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 20-21 (1980). 
123. W. Devis & Sons Ltd. v. Atkins, [1977] A.C. 931. 
124. The American employer's rights in such cases flow from the collective agreement, a 
bargain with the union under which the employer retains certain discharge rights. One union 
may willingly submit to more stringent discipline than another union. See Koretz & Raobin, 
Arbitration & Individual Rights, in THE FUTURE OF -LABOR ARBITRATION IN AMERICA 113, 117 
(1976). 
125. One commentator has observed that the concept of fariness is norm-reflecting rather 
than norm-setting. Elias, supra note 118, at 212-13. 
126. Labor arbitrators seek to determine what the union has been able to wrest from the 
employer's unilateral control. Under a fair-dismissal statute, the power of employees to compel 
the employer to concede certain disciplinary issues is irrelevant. 
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D. Accommodating Private Dispute-Resolution Agreements 
229 
Under the British legislation, private dispute-resolution arrangements 
can be substituted for the statutory provisions if the private procedures 
meet certain requirements. Such arrangements are permitted because 
both the Labour Party and Conservative Party believe that voluntary 
private dispute-resolution mechanisms should be encouraged. Thus, they 
are allowed to co-exist alongside the public complaints procedure with 
its hearing before a neutral tribunal. 
Under section 65 of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 
the employer and union(s) who are signatories to the dispute-resolution 
agreement may jointly seek an order allowing their privately established 
procedures to substitute for the statutory provisions. 121 If the order 
is granted, the statutory provisions will not apply and those covered by 
the dispute-resolution agreement will be denied access to the industrial 
tribunals. The private agreement must clearly state who is covered and 
what procedures will be followed in discharge cases. The procedures must 
be available "without discrimination" to all covered employees. 128 
Because of the requirements imposed on these substituted private 
arrangements, the British government has not defaulted on its obliga-
tion under the ILO standards to guarantee all employees protection 
against unfair dismissal. For instance, there are two major hurdles most 
private agreements fail to surmount. First, the remedies afforded by 
the private agreement must be "on the whole as beneficial as (but not 
necessarily identical with) those provided" by the statute. 129 Second, 
the private agreement must "include a right of arbitration or adjudica-
tion by an independent referee, or by a tribunal or other independent 
body" in cases where "a decision cannot otherwise be reached." 130 
In 1971, the rate of unionization in Britain was much higher than 
in the United States, yet highly developed grievance/arbitration pro-
cedures were rare. Most private agreements consisted merely of a 
grievance procedure, and even these were rarely formalized. Arbitra-
tion by a neutral outsider was extremely uncommon. As a result, when 
the statute took effect there was no rush by unions and employers to 
have their private agreements certified as substitutes for the statutory 
provisions, for it was clear that nearly all private agreements fell short 
127. Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978, ch. 44, § 65. 
128. Id. § 65(1)(c). In Britain, there is no concept of exclusive representation with the corol-
lary obligation that the union represent all workers in the bargaining unit fairly regardless of 
whether an individual belongs to the union. Cf. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (American 
unions, as exclusive representatives, have the duty to represent their members fairly). Traditionally, 
British unions have been seen as representing only their own members. Thus, section 65(c) has 
the effect of imposing a limited duty of fair representation. 
129. Id. § 65(d). 
130. Id. § 65(e). 
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of the requirements of section 65. 131 To some extent, this parallels the 
prevailing American situation. Although non-union companies may have 
formal personnel procedures permitting employees to complain that 
their discharge was unfair, almost none of these procedures include 
any element of impartial review. 
Compliance with ILO standards does not require a system of govern-
mental tribunals. Conceivably, a government could meet its ILO obliga-
tions by mandating the use of private arbitration to settle discharge 
disputes. Most governments in democratic, capitalist countries, however, 
would find such a method an unacceptable intrusion into the workings 
of the private sector. To provide comprehensive protection against un-
fair dismissal, a capitalist government must therefore enact statutory 
procedures and then include exemptions for private arbitration, with 
the expectation that private parties will be motivated to develop their 
own arrangements. The British experience, however, indicates that such 
expectations are not realistic. Neither the statutory provisions nor the 
possibility of exemptions for private agreements spurred the further 
development of private agreements which fell a bit short of the section 
65 requirements. It seems that once the statutory protection was 
available, the need for private arbitration was no longer evident. Even 
if employees and employers had wanted to experiment with private 
arbitration, the expense involved was seen as too great a disincentive. 
Since the passage of the legislation, British unions and employee-
staff associations have become actively involved with employers in deter-
mining when conduct warrants discipline. Internal grievance procedures 
on discipline matters have also become much more refined. Whether 
the failure of private parties to use section 65 is a cause for disap-
pointment is thus not clear because the legislation has had the effect 
of persuading employers to collaborate voluntarily with their employees 
on the setting of disciplinary standards. 132 
E. Impact of Britain's Statutory Guarantee 
Since 1971, unfair-dismissal legislation has been strongly supported 
by all political parties in Britain. Although there have been political 
131. It is not definite whether section 65(e) requires that every discharged person have the 
right to go to arbitration if the matter is not settled in the grievance stages. Some commentators 
believe that the statute does not require that the union invoked arbitration for every grievant 
whose case cannot be settled, as long as the refusal to go to arbitration is based on non-
discriminatory grounds. See, e.g., S. ANDERMAN, supra note 105, at 288-93. Because there have 
been very few applications under section 65, there is no body of case law authoritatively inter-
preting the meaning of section 65(e). 
132. Subsequent to the Donovan Report, both major political parties published proposals 
for labor legislation. On this issue, the Labour government opined: "[o]ne effect of legislation 
will undoubtedly be to encourage the development of clear rules as to the circumstances in which 
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differences over the length of service that workers should have with 
a company before they qualify for protection under the statute, 133 the 
main guarantees and remedies have remained untouched. 134 The cost 
of government has been a controversial topic in Britain under the present 
Conservative government, but the system of industrial tribunals has 
never been a target in a cost-cutting campaign. 135 
Perhaps the greatest change wrought by the introduction of protec-
tion against unfair dismissal has been in personnel practices. 136 Aware 
that they would be liable for unfair dismissal, companies of all sizes 
reviewed their procedures on discipline and discharge. In so doing, pro-
cedures were written down and personnel managers and supervisors 
were instructed on their use. Unions and other employee groups became 
involved in the process of formulating disciplinary rules. Employees 
became much better informed as to what conduct would warrant 
discipline and with what severity. In addition, selection procedures and 
on-the-job training practices were improved to avoid employing per-
sons who would not fit in with the employer's needs. Overall, the legisla-
tion has motivated employers to arrange their personnel practices so 
that the likelihood of imposing arbitrary, inconsistent, or unfair 
discipline is greatly reduced. Not only does it grant relief to those un-
fairly dismissed; it has also minimized employees' chances of being 
unfairly dismissed. 
III. A STATUTORY GUARANTEE FOR THE UNITED STATES 
In the past ten years the number of persons advocating that American 
employees be protected against unfair dismissal has notably increased. 
Some supporters of this protection have argued that the courts should 
recognize an implied term in the contract of employment, 137 while others 
employees may be dismissed and for what reasons, and the improvement of voluntary procedures." 
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EMPLOYMENT, IN PLACE OF STRIFE, CMD. No. 3888, para. 103 (1969). 
These expectations have been fulfilled only in part. See Lewis, supra note 109, at 718. 
133. See supra note 88. When the qualifying period was raised from 26 weeks to one year 
by the Conservative government in 1979, unfair dismissal applications decreased by 200Jo. P. 
ELIAS, B. NAPIER & P. WALLINGTON, supra note 122, at 21 n.l. 
134. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text. 
135. Handling about 46,000 applications in 1978, the unfair dismissal system as a whole cost 
about £5 million (about $10 million). Hoffman, supra note 109, at 173. 
136. One result has been professionalization of the personnel management field. Many com-
panies now require or strongly prefer that their personnel managers have passed the examina-
tions of the Institute of Personnel Management, the national professional association. A knowledge 
of unfair dismissal law and good disciplinary practice is necessary to pass the written examination. 
137. See, e.g., Blackburn, supra note 8, at 491-92 (supporting the view that common law 
theories, tort as well as contract, should be developed because legislation is unlikely at this time); 
Note, Challenging the Employment-At-Will Doctrine Through Modern Contract Theory,, 16 U. 
MICH. J .L. REF. 449 (1983) (supporting the view that contract principles should be developed). 
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have preferred that legislation, usually federal, be enacted. 138 Both posi-
tions, however, have drawbacks. 
Having state courts adopt the principle of fair dismissal would, besides 
proceeding at a slow rate, result in a lack of uniformity to the extent 
each state defined the doctrine differently. Some states might define 
the scope of the protection so narrowly as to offer a remedy to only 
a small proportion of those unfairly dismissed. Multi-state employers 
would have to keep track of varying state developments, thus under-
mining the practice of standard personnel policies. In addition, pro-
tection enforced only by a lawsuit inevitably means expensive, time-
consuming litigation. While upper-level employees might pursue their 
remedies through a lawsuit, the rest of the workforce most likely would 
find the expense and doubtful outcome of protracted litigation a daunt-
ing prospect. 139 Relying on the courts to enforce a right of fair dismissal 
would mean that a significant number of unfairly dismissed persons 
might never attempt to vindicate their rights. 
Federal legislation would certainly apply uniformly throughout the 
nation and it might offer comprehensive protection, depending upon 
the enforcement mechanism chosen. Its main practical disadvantage, 
however, is the improbability that federal legislation on this issue will 
be passed in the foreseeable future. 
Given the drawbacks in state judicial or federal legislative proposals, 
the best solution would be to make state legislation the vehicle for 
granting protection against unfair dismissal. The challenge is to devise 
a state-based system which will provide a modicum of uniformity 
throughout the nation and can be administered at modest cost. This 
Article proposes that this can be done by having each state enact a 
statutory guarantee against unfair dismissal that would be enforced 
through the same procedures presently used for unemployment com-
pensation claims. Under this proposal, costs will be _contained, no ad-
ditional government bureaucracy need be created, and state courts will 
not be flooded with new cases. 1 40 
Uniformity in this proposed system would be provided by the use 
138. See, e.g., Summers, supra note 8 (favoring legislation); see also Stieber, Protection Against 
Unfair Dismissal: A Comparative View, 3 COMP. LAB. L. 229 (1980) (favoring federal legisla-
tion); Note, supra note 6 (advocating state legislation). 
139. The division of the labor force refers to those below the median wage rate. The median 
weekly earnings for full-time employed males are $379; for full-time employed females, the median 
weekly earnings are $248. See supra note 12. Unless legal aid is available, it is unlikely that 
persons earning less than $20,000 per year who have been recently discharged will retain private 
counsel. 
140. It is assumed that a fairly high percentage of those discharged from employment presently 
file for unemployment compensation benefits. Most employees are aware that persons can 
sometimes be qualified to receive benefits even after a discharge. There are no reported statistics 
or reliable estimates on the number of persons who do not even file a claim because they are 
aware they would be disqualified on the grounds of willful misconduct. 
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of existing unemployment insurance programs. All states have unemploy-
ment insurance statutes which conform to the requirements of the federal 
participatory program. 141 All states have an agency administering their 
unemployment compensation system. 142 The state systems typically re-
quire that a complaint be filed at a local office and all provide for 
a hearing before an agency hearing officer if the claimant is deter-
mined to be disqualified. 143 All state systems channel appeals into the 
regular state court system. 144 Finally, the grounds for disqualifying per-
sons from receiving unemployment compensation benefits are substan-
tially similar in all states. 145 This remarkable uniformity in state prac-
tice sfems from the way in which unemployment protection first arose 
m the United States. 
A. Uniformity in the State Systems 
In 1933, the United States was one of the few industrialized nations 
without any form of unemployment insurance and only five states had 
any such program of their own. 146 With unemployment at unprecedented 
levels, momentum built up in support of an unemployment insurance 
program which culminated in the passage of the Social Security Act 
in 1935. 147 By 1937, all forty-eight states, the District of Columbia, 
Alaska, and Hawaii had enacted unemployment insurance statutes which 
qualified for participation in the new program. 148 Because of the ex-
141. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSA· 
TION: FINAL REPORT, sec. 13.4 (1980). 
142. Id. sec. 7.0. 
143. Id. sec. 7.3. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. sec. 4.4. 
146. For an exhaustive review of then-existing programs, see A. EPSTEIN, INSECURITY: A 
CHALLENGE TO AMERICA (2d rev. ed. 1938). 
147. 49 Stat. 639 (codified as amended at Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 
3301-3311 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1396m (1976 & Supp IV 1980). The incom-
ing administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt acted quickly to meet this pressing need. 
On June 29, 1934, President Roosevelt established the Committee on Economic Security, chaired 
by Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor. A. EPSTEIN, supra note 146, at 672. After extensive 
hearings, the commitee issued its final report on January 17, 1935, a report which contained 
the main elements of the social security legislation that would be passed within the year. See 
generally id. at 684-96. 
Because of the urgency of the unemployment situation, Part IX dealing with unemployment 
went into effect immediately on January I, 1936. See I. BRODEN, LAW OF SOCIAL SECURITY AND 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE § 1.04, at JO (1962). 
148. See I. BRODEN, supra note 147, § 8.01, at 312-13. Under the Social Security Act of 
1935, the unemployment insurance program is a participatory federal scheme. Essentially, it is 
a federally aided, state-administered program; the states have great autonomy over their pro-
grams. See id. at 311-12. Federal coordination and control are injected into the system, however, 
because the Secretary of Labor must determine that a state program is qualified under the Social 
Security Act before any provision of federal funds to the state can be authorized. See 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 501-503 (1977). 
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treme rapidity with which the Social Security bill went through Con-
gress and with which the states enacted their own legislation to qualify 
for participation in the unemployment insurance program, substantial 
reliance was necessarily placed on the recommendations included in 
the final report of the Committee on Economic Security. 149 Moved by 
the need to act quickly, the states simply incorporated the suggested 
factors into their own statutes. As a result, even though each state 
has its own legislation, there is great uniformity in the reasons for 
disqualification. 
The general premise underlying the unemployment compensation pro-
gram is that persons who are unemployed through no fault of their 
own should be provided with government financial assistance to tide 
them over until they can find new employment. 1 so To be eligible, the 
unemployed person must be able and available for work. Generally, 
workers are disqualified from receiving benefits if they refuse suitable 
work, voluntarily left work without good cause, were discharged for 
misconduct, or are out of work because of a labor dispute. 151 Every 
state disqualifies persons unemployed because they were discharged for 
work-related misconduct, usually for a wanton or willful disregard of 
the employer's interests. 152 
1. State unemployment compensation procedures- This Article's 
proposal for a statutory guarantee of fair dismissal is designed to in-
corporate those procedures already utilized by the states in unemploy-
ment compensation cases. By having certain procedures serve a dual 
function, costs would be contained and the procedural requirements 
placed on dismissed workers would be streamlined. A survey of the 
current unemployment compensation claims procedure as it operates 
in Pennsylvania reveals how such a state agency can be made to serve 
more than one purpose. 153 
Presently, an employee dismissed in Pennsylvania files for unemploy-
ment compensation at the local office of the Bureau of Employment 
Security. In so doing, claimants fill out a form giving information con-
cerning their last employment and the reasons for the cessation of that 
employment. Claimants are directed to check one of the following as 
the reasons for their separation from work: quit, discharged, laid-
off, other. Following the filing of the claim, the employer is sent a 
149. See A. EPSTEIN, supra note 146, at 732-45. 
150. The phrase "through no fault of their own" appears in many state statutes. See, e.g., 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 752 (Purdon 1%4). Because the program was designed to provide 
short-term relief only, unemployment benefits terminate at a certain point regardless of whether 
the claimant has managed to find a new job. 
151. See I. BRODEN, supra note 147, § 8.01, at 312-13. 
152. See id. § 12.01, at 468 n. l (citing cases). 
153. The unemployment compensation provisions are codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, 
§§ 751-914 (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1981). 
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form requesting information such as the claimant's employment dates, 
job position, and wages. On this form the employer is asked the reason 
for the claimant's separation from employment. When the local Bureau 
of Employment Security office receives the employer's form, a telephone 
follow-up is made if the employer's information does not correspond 
with that given by the claimant. For instance, the employer may have 
stated that the claimant quit voluntarily and was not discharged, or 
that the claimant was discharged for willful misconduct rather than 
that there was no work for the claimant. 
At this point the local office of the Bureau of Employment Security 
makes a determination of the claimant's eligibility for unemployment 
compensation. A notice setting forth the eligibility finding is then mailed 
to the parties. If the claimant is disqualified, the Bureau must cite some 
reason from the disqualification section of the unemployment com-
pensation statute.1 54 In discharge cases, the usual reason is the willful 
misconduct of the employee. 155 
If disqualified, the claimant may file a notice of appeal. 1 56 The time 
between the filing of the notice and a hearing is relatively short, usually 
three weeks. Hearings are conducted by referees of the Unemployment 
Compensation Board of Review at the Board offices. The hearings are 
informal, and the proceedings are tape recorded. The hearings take 
place in small conference rooms, with the referee at the head of the 
table and the parties on the opposite sides of the table. Although par-
ties are sometimes represented by lawyers, this is not standard. Com-
panies, especially small employers, are often represented by a person-
nel manager, sometimes accompanied by a supervisor. Claimants may 
come alone, be accompanied by a friend, or be represented by a 
paralegal from Community Legal Services. Although claimants are per-
mitted to have private counsel, most appear at the hearing without 
counsel. 
The referee's decision is issued quickly, often within ten days of the 
hearing. The losing party may appeal to the Unemployment Compen-
sation Board of Review. In filing a notice of appeal, no reason for 
appeal need be given. After the notice is filed, a transcript of the pro-
ceedings is made from the tape recording. The parties receive a copy 
of the transcript free of charge. The parties file written briefs which 
are important because oral argument before the Board of Review is 
154. The list of statutory reasons can be found at id. § 802. 
155. Willful misconduct is behavior which evidences (I) wanton and willful disregard of the 
employer's interests, (2) deliberate violation of rules, (3) disregard of standards of behavior which 
an employer can reasonably expect from an employee, or (4) negligence which manifests culpability, 
wrongful intent, evil design, or intentional and substantial disregard for the employer's interests 
or the employee's duties and obligations. Frick v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 31 
Pa. Commw. 198, 375 A.2d 879 (1977). 
156. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 822 (Purdon 1964). 
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rare. The Board normally makes its decision on the basis of the record 
and the briefs. 157 
Either party can appeal to Pennsylvania's Commonwealth Court 
within thirty days of receiving the Board of Review's decision. 158 The 
court's scope of review is limited to two questions: whether the Board 
of Review's decision was supported by evidence in the record and 
whether the Board's decision was within its statutory authority. 159 Deci-
sions of the Commonwealth Court may be appealed to the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court but appeals in discharge cases are rare. 
2. Issues raised in unemployment cases- Before turning to a discus-
sion of how unemployment claims procedures can accommodate the 
administration of state legislative protection against unfair dismissal, 
it is important to consider the issues referees are called upon to decide 
in discharge cases. Because the courts have distinguished a valid basis 
for discharge by an employer from willful misconduct which disqualifies 
a claimant from receiving unemployment compensation, it might be 
inferred that labor arbitrators and unemployment compensation referees 
are accustomed to approaching discharge cases in very different ways. 160 
This is not, however, the case; referees applying the standards of the 
unemployment compensation statute frequently employ the same method 
of analysis as that used by arbitrators deciding whether an employer 
had just cause to discharge under a collective bargaining agreement. 161 
A few examples can illustrate this point. Arbitrators often find that 
discharge was unjust because the seriousness of the offense did not 
warrant such severe discipline. Similarly, a single act of serious miscon-
duct may constitute willful misconduct disqualifying the claimant from 
benefits, 162 but a single, minor, and casual act of negligence or 
carelessness may not. 163 Foreknowledge of the consequences of an act 
is a factor considered by arbitrators in determining whether a discharge 
was just. Similarly, an employee may not be found to have engaged 
157. The Board of Review may remand for more testimony if a relevant issue was not ad-
dressed at the hearing. Id. § 824. 
158. Id. § 830.1. 
159. Id. 
160. Theoretically, in determining whether the discharge should be upheld, arbitrators ask 
only whether the employer had just cause for discharge. Under this approach, the willfulness 
of the employee behavior is irrelevant; only the effect of the misconduct is important. 
161. Professor Clyde Summers has noted that there is a broad consensus among arbitrators 
on the underlying principles that should be applied in discipline and discharge cases. See Sum-
mers, supra note 8, at 501. See also Stieber, supra note 138, at 237-38. 
162. See, e.g., Askew v. Commonwealth Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 56 Pa. 
Commw. 260, 424 A.2d 608 (1981); Schaefer v. Commonwealth Unemployment Comp. Bd. of 
Review, 32 Pa. Commw. 200, 378 A.2d 1044 (1977). 
163. See, e.g., Coulter v. Commonwealth Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 16 Pa. 
Commw. 462, 332 A.2d 876 (1975); Loder v. Commonwealth Unemployment Comp. Bd. of 
Review, 6 Pa. Commw. 484, 296 A.2d 297 (1972). 
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in willful misconduct when there was no warning about the consequences 
of the act and the seriousness of the offense was not readily apparent. 164 
Arbitrators will apply elementary notions of fairness in determining 
whether a discharge was just, such as asking whether discipline was 
evenly imposed or whether the employer's policy on discipline could 
be viewed as rational. Similarly, courts have ref used to find willful 
misconduct disqualifying when employers were inconsistent in their ap-
plication of discipline165 or when their disciplinary policy punished some-
one innocent of misconduct. 166 The reasonableness of a supervisor's 
order and the reasonableness of the employee's refusal to obey that 
order are issues considered by both arbitrators and referees. 161 The ap-
proach of arbitrators and referees is also similar when the employer's 
asserted reason for discharge, an admitted act of misconduct, appears 
to be mere pretext. 168 
Over the range of discharge cases, unemployment compensation 
referees are applying many of the concepts of fairness developed by 
labor arbitrators under the just cause standard. There is one type of 
case, however, where the standards applied by referees and arbitrators 
are quite different. This occurs when an employee, though acting in 
good faith, cannot perform assigned tasks in a satisfactory manner. 
This may be due to mental or physical inability, or to factors such 
as transportation difficulties and family responsibilities which prevent 
the employee from regularly appearing at work on time. Arbitrators 
in these cases would find that the employer had just cause for discharge. 
Unemployment compensation referees, however, would find that the 
employee's discharge had not stemmed from willful misconduct and 
would therefore allow compensation. 
164. See, e.g., O'Keefe v. Commonwealth Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 18 Pa. 
Commw. 151, 333 A.2d 815 (1975) (employees did not realize they were not allowed to eat stale 
pastries). 
165. See, e.g., Woodson v. Commonwealth Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 461 Pa. 
439, 336 A.2d 867 (1975). 
166. In Paige v. Commonwealth Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 39 Pa. Commw. 
141, 394 A.2d 1318 (1978), the employer discharged both persons engaged in a fight after work 
in the employee washroom. The court refused to disqualify the claimant from receiving benefits, 
because the unrebutted evidence indicated that the claimant was not the aggressor and could 
not have avoided the aggressor. Id. at 1319. 
167. See, e.g., Robertson v. Commonwealth Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 53 Pa. 
Commw. 307,417 A.2d 293 (1980) (holding that a blanket refusal by employee to work overtime 
was unreasonable and constituted willful misconduct); cf. Horace W. Longacre, Inc. v. Com-
monwealth Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 12 Pa. Commw. 176, 316 A.2d 110 (1974) 
(holding that employee who was going off on break time and refused order to return to work 
was reasonable in doing so and not disqualified). 
168. See, e.g., Panaro v. Commonwealth Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 51 Pa. 
Commw. 19, 413 A.2d 772 (1980) (employee misconduct was so removed in time from the date 
of discharge as to cast doubt on the employer's assertion that the discharge was based on the 
misconduct). 
238 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 16:2 
B. Defining the Statutory Guarantee 
The core element of this Article's proposal is a statute enacted in 
every state which provides simply that ''every employee has the right 
to be dismissed fairly and for just cause." No complex statutory for-
mula is required to provide effective protection against unfair dismissal, 
as several decades of experience in the unionized sector demonstrate. 
Indeed, thousands of collective bargaining agreements in the United 
States contain a clause which states simply that the employer has the 
right to discharge "for just cause." 169 When an employee covered by 
a collective agreement is discharged, the union may challenge the 
management action by asserting that the employer lacked just cause 
to discharge the employee. In applying the just cause standard, ar-
bitrators ask not only whether the employer had a substantively valid 
basis for the discharge, but also whether the employer followed fair 
procedures in the circumstances. 110 
One attractive feature of the just cause standard is its straightfor-
ward and non-technical nature. By understanding the substantive stan-
dard, those closest to the discharge (the supervisor, the employee, the 
union representative) can readily apply the standard to the circumstances 
and gauge the likelihood that an arbitrator will uphold the discharge. 
In many instances, the employee and the union will realize they have 
no substantial case against the employer and will not process the 
grievance through to arbitration, thereby not burdening the system or 
incurring unnecessary costs. This self-assessment of the merits of the 
case is a vitally important feature of the easily comprehensible stan-
dard. Not only does it reduce the caseload of arbitrators, it does so 
without sacrificing the confidence of employees in that process estab-
lished to enforce their rights. Therefore, drafters of state legislation 
should avoid unnecessarily legalistic language. Rather, they should en-
sure that the phrasing of the statutory guarantee is easily understood 
by those it is designed to protect. 
1. Complaints procedure- Any claim of unfair dismissal under 
the state statute should be filed within ten weeks of termination, unless 
the claimant works under a collective bargaining agreement. As will 
be discussed, the filing deadline should be extended for those in this 
latter category. 111 The most efficient system in terms of cost to the 
state and burden on the claimant would be to have complaints of un-
169. Estimates vary but the lowest estimate is that at least 80% of collective agreements pro-
vide that the employer can discharge only "for just cause" or "for cause." 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAIN-
ING NEGOTIATIONS & CONT. (BNA) 40:1 (1979). 
170. For a brief discussion of the principles of procedural fairness applied by arbitrators, 
see Summers, supra note 8, at 503-04. 
171. See infra text following note 185. 
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fair dismissal made at the same time the discharged person files for 
unemployment compensation at the local office of the state agency. 
When claimants check off "discharged" on the claim form as the reason 
for their separation from work, the agency employee should ask whether 
they will also be claiming that they have been unfairly discharged. An 
explanation of the right to be dismissed fairly and for just cause should 
be provided at that time, either by the agency employee or by pro-
viding claimants with a pamphlet containing the relevant information. 
This explanation might include the names of specialized agencies em-
powered to deal with complaints that a discharge was based, for ex-
ample, on union activity or race discrimination. 
In many cases involving alleged misconduct, the claimant will be 
found guilty of misconduct and thus ineligible for unemployment com-
pensation benefits, with the case proceeding to a hearing only if the 
claimant wishes to press the matter. If an employee is claiming unfair 
dismissal, on the other hand, the case must proceed to a hearing so 
that the referee can decide the fairness issue and determine an ap-
propriate remedy. Hence, it is essential that a local-office employee 
explain to claimants in these cases that their claim has two distinct 
aspects with different procedures for each. 
2. Application of the guarantee- When a claim for unemployment 
compensation from a discharged employee is filed, state unemploy-
ment compensation referees currently must scrutinize the employer's 
reason for discharging the claimant. 112 In nearly all cases, the conduct 
of the employee is at issue. If the referee determines that the employee 
was discharged for willful misconduct, the employee will be denied 
unemployment compensation. The inconsistency between current 
unemployment compensation standards and the arbitral just cause stan-
dard mainly arises when an employer has good reason to discharge 
an employee not guilty of willful misconduct. For example, consider 
a case where a mother frequently is absent from work because of a 
sick child and alternative child-care arrangements cannot be made. An 
employer is certainly entitled to discharge a person who is repeatedly 
absent from work because the needs of the business demand that the 
job be performed. It is equally clear, however, that the woman has 
not acted willfully to destroy the employment relationship. Accord-
ingly, the state referee would determine that the woman is entitled to 
unemployment benefits for there is no reason to deny her the safety 
net of unemployment compensation. Nevertheless, the employer did 
have just cause to discharge the woman. 
This factual situation illustrates that state unemployment compen-
sation referees will need to make two separate inquiries in discharge 
172. See supra text accompanying notes 152-58. 
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cases: first, whether the employee caused his or her own discharge 
through willful misconduct, and, second, whether the employer acted 
fairly and had just cause for discharge. 173 Referees are already skilled 
in making the first determination. The standards used in making the 
second determination are not alien to referees, though many referees 
may not be entirely familiar with them. A short course on the just 
cause standard should be more than sufficient to acquaint referees, 
already familiar with discharge cases, with the nuances of the new stan-
dard. Some states may choose to have only a portion of their referees 
trained to decide unfair-dismissal cases. With less than a full comple-
ment of referees specializing in unfair-dismissal cases, the cost of these 
training seminars can be minimized. 
Courses designed to educate unemployment compensation referees 
on the just cause standard should be easy to develop. Arbitrator train-
ing programs 174 have already devised course materials and several ex-
cellent text references are currently on the market. 175 Thus, the cost 
of developing courses and course materials should be modest. States 
could instead commission experienced arbitrators on a fixed-fee basis 
to hear unfair-dismissal cases, thereby obviating the need for training 
any referees. 
3. Remedies- Effective remedies are essential to the success of any 
system seeking to provide comprehensive and speedy protection against 
unfair dismissal. In labor arbitration, reinstatement is the standard 
remedy. 1 76 There is no damages award, but reinstated employees may 
receive backpay for the time they were out of work. Under this Arti-
cle's proposed state statute, reinstatement to the former job or re-employ-
ment with the same employer in another job should be permitted, but 
only in those instances where the claimant and the employer accept 
it as a remedy and the hearing referee determines that it would be ap-
propriate in the circumstances. In reinstatement cases the claimant 
should receive backpay for the period between the date of discharge 
and the date of re-employment. 
173. In most cases of willful misconduct, it will be found that the employer had just cause 
to discharge. There may be cases, however, where certain misconduct typically has been ignored 
at the workplace. It would be unfair for an employer to discharge an employee for an offense 
usually overlooked. Even under the willful misconduct standard it has been held that an employee 
could not have intended to commit an offense punishable by discharge in such circumstances 
and thus was qualified to receive unemployment compensation benefits. See Woodson v. Com-
monwealth Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 461 Pa. 439, 336 A.2d 867 (1975). 
174. The Labor and Employment Section of the American Bar Association has a pilot 
arbitrator-training program. The New York State School of Industrial Relations at Cornell Univer-
sity has a similar program. Both are designed for persons with little or no arbitration experience. 
Many business and law schools offer courses on arbitration. 
175. See, e.g., F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 612-14 (3d ed. 1973); 
0. FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION (2d ed. )983). 
176. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 175, at 648. 
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Although reinstatement is the standard remedy in labor arbitration, 
it should be used sparingly in non-union settings. Even for unionized 
employees, reinstatement should not be the automatic remedy. 
Employees who have been discharged and had their union support their 
grievance can expect the union's solidarity to provide them organized 
support once they are back on the job. A worker in a non-union set-
ting, however, may find the former workplace a hostile environment, 
with co-workers wary of siding with someone so clearly out of favor 
as to be fired. Even a unionized employee, especially in white-collar 
settings, may find it difficult to resume employment if the atmosphere 
at the workplace is similar to that preceding the discharge. Hence, 
referees must be aware that a short period of re-employment is rarely 
an effective remedy. It is usually preferable to award damages and 
have the claimant start afresh in a new job. 
The standard remedy under this Article's proposed statutory system 
would be a monetary award, paid by the employer directly to the 
employee. This award would have two components, a basic award and 
a compensatory award. All workers found to have been unfairly dis-
missed would receive a basic award calculated according to a statutory 
formula. The statutory formula would provide for an amount based 
on length of service, perhaps one week's pay for each year of service, 
with a minimum award of one month's pay. The compensatory award 
would be awarded only at the referee's discretion and would compen-
sate the employee for any actual loss suffered, but only to the extent 
that the basic award is considered inadequate compensation. The referee 
should take into account factors such as loss of pension rights, impact 
of loss of seniority in taking a new job, emotional distress, and similar 
items. The referee should also take into account whether the basic award 
is too small an amount to restrain employers from discharging unfairly. 
This might be a problem with newer employees because employers may 
find it worthwhile to discharge them arbitrarily if the only cost is pay-
ment of a small basic award. There should be a statutory ceiling on 
the compensatory award, perhaps one year's salary or an amount equal-
ing the national median salary of a full-time employee. 1 77 
Whether any compensatory award would be appropriate for a 
reinstated claimant would be a matter for each state to decide. In cases 
where the unfairly discharged employee suffered substantial emotional 
distress, for example, after being accused of an offense such as theft 
or drug usage, reinstatement with backpay is hardly an adequate remedy 
177. Because claimants must state what their wages were at the time of separation when fil-
ing for unemployment compensation and employers verify this information, there should be no 
difficulty in using the employee's wages in making these calculations. If a national median figure 
were used, the monthly information issued by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor could be used as an update. 
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and compensatory awards should be permitted. Similarly, the state may 
decide that receipt of both the basic award and unemployment com-
pensation benefits would be double-dipping, and modify the benefits 
period to exclude the initial period of unemployment that the basic 
award is designed to cover. 118 
Although the amounts provided under the proposed system do not 
match those some juries might award in particularly emotionally ap-
pealing cases, discharged employees as a group should pref er the predic-
tability of the award and the prompt, inexpensive resolution of their 
complaint. Because the aim of the statute is to guarantee protection 
against unfair dismissal, the amounts suggested should provide a finan-
cial disincentive sufficient to dissuade employers from terminating 
employees without cause. In addition, the amounts suggested would 
in most cases provide adequate compensation for actual loss suffered, 
assuming that most discharged persons can find another job within 
a year. Finally, it is not unreasonable to exclude the possibility of ex-
cessive, windfall jury awards. To do otherwise and permit resort to 
the courts could undermine the uniformity, comprehensiveness, and 
predictability of the proposed statutory system. 
4. Coverage- In keeping with the basic premise of the ILO Con-
vention that a government should guarantee protection for all workers, 
no category of employees should be excluded unless it has been 
guaranteed equivalent protection under another statute. In particular, 
lower- and middle-level managers responsible for devising and imple-
menting the employer's policies should not be excluded on grounds 
that they are agents of the employer. The belief that managers need 
no protection is outdated, as any survey of cases challenging the 
employment-at-will doctrine reveals. This broad protection readily blends 
into the framework of the statutory proposal, because the coverage 
already required by the federal unemployment compensation par-
ticipatory program is extremely broad, with agricultural workers the 
main category likely to be excluded. 1 79 
States may wish to exclude from coverage those persons who have 
been with the employer for only a short time. In effect, such an exclu-
sion is a realistic acknowledgment that a new worker may not fit as 
planned into the organization. Because this usually becomes apparent 
within six months to a year, the exclusion should not be extended to 
178. If a person is unemployed for a long period of time, unemployment benefits may run 
out. The state may therefore wish to tack an equivalent period on to the end of the benefits 
period. For example, if a person has been employed for 10 years and is unfairly dismissed, the 
basic award would be the equivalent of 10 weeks of pay. The state might require that the claimant 
return the unemployment compensation benefits received for the first 10 weeks of unemploy-
ment. In calculating the claimant's eligibility for benefits, the state would thus count the per-
son's eleventh week of unemployment as week one. 
179. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, supra note 141, sec. 3.0. 
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employees with more than one year of service. Without this exclusion, 
protection would attach from the first day and some employers might 
hesitate to hire a new worker unless they were certain they would be 
satisfied with the applicant's performance. To encourage employers 
to hire, it may therefore be necessary to give employers some leeway 
to discharge during the first few months of employment; however, care 
should be taken that this right to discharge at will is not abused. 180 
An exclusion for low-service employees effectively leaves workers 
in high turnover and seasonal industries without protection. Because 
employees in these industries are often poorly paid, they are unlikely 
to be able to fight effectively against unfair or discriminatory 
discharge. 181 Hence, any exclusionary clause based on length of ser-
vice should be carefully scrutinized to determine if it will exclude those 
most in need of protection. 
C. Interface with Arbitration 
The states should exclude from the benefit of the statutory system 
only those persons who have access to a private dispute-resolution system 
which on the whole is as favorable as, though not necessarily identical 
to, the state system. To so qualify, the private system must guarantee 
the discharged worker three things: first, the right to be dismissed 
fairly and for just cause; second, the right' to a hearing before a neutral 
arbitrator; 182 and third, the right to receive adequate remedies, such 
as reinstatement with backpay. If these criteria are met, the state can 
certify the private system as an alternative forum for the resolution 
of discharge cases. 
Most often mentioned in this regard is the system of labor arbitra-
tion whereby employers having unionized employees agree that disputes 
over discipline and discharge may be resolved through a grievance and 
arbitration procedure. 183 Arbitration is an approved method of dispute 
180. The probationary period need not be as long as one year. State legislatures may find 
six months sufficient. The British practice indicates that a shorter probationary period compelled 
employers to consider their needs and the aptitude of the job applicants more carefully, thus 
improving hiring policies. 
181. See, e.g., Heason, Laboring: At fast-food chains, the help is low-priced, too, Philadelphia 
Inquirer, Jan. 17, 1983, at 1 (noting fast-food industry turnover of 300% a year). 
182. To be neutral, the arbitrator must be an outsider to the company, and must be selected 
by both the employer and the employee. Arbitrators paid by one side only would not be con-
sidered neutral. Although presently rare, this does occur when a nonunion company voluntarily 
chooses to have an outsider arbitrate a dispute. 
183. Most agreements have a multi-step procedure whereby the grieyance is considered by 
union and management representatives, starting at the lowest level and working upwards. Arbitra-
tion is the final step and usually the union must invoke that step in writing. Not all grievances 
are arbitrable, depending upon the scope of the arbitration clause in the contract. For a concise 
description of the operation of the grievance procedure, see A. Cox, D. BoK & R. GORMAN, 
LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 513-53 (9th ed. 1981). 
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resolution under the ILO Convention, but only if the arbitration pro-
cedure provides for a guaranteed right to a hearing. 184 Most 
grievance/arbitration procedures in collective bargaining agreements 
fail to meet this requirement. A hearing only occurs when the union 
invokes the last stage of the arbitration process; however, the union 
has discretion to decide not to take a case to arbitration if the chances 
of winning appear to be low. 185 
Recognizing that grievance/arbitration procedures are part of the 
fabric of the labor-management relationship, state statutes should pro-
vide that persons who can utilize such a procedure not be allowed to 
file under the state system until the private procedure has been com-
pleted. If the grievance procedure has been completed and the discharged 
person's case has not gone to arbitration, the discharged person should 
then be allowed to file a claim with the state system. This filing should 
be required to be made within one month of the completion of the 
last step of the grievance procedure. 
This accommodation between the private labor-arbitration system 
and the state unfair-dismissal system should satisfy employers who object 
to employees getting "two bites at the apple." In addition, unions should 
not be unduly worried that the state system will somehow diminish 
the attractiveness of unionization to the average employee. First, private 
arbitration will be preserved and, in most instances, will probably of-
fer justice more closely tailored to the standards of the individual 
workplace. Second, should a case not go to arbitration, employees m;iy 
seek the assistance of their union at the hearing before the unemploy-
ment compensation referee. In Britain, having the union provide some-
one to represent the member at the tribunal hearing is seen as an 
important benefit of union membership. 
From a union's viewpoint, providing the union member with a lawyer 
at the state hearing, rather than taking the case to arbitration, is the 
less expensive alternative. 186 A union which loses a fair representation 
suit may be liable for a portion of the damages awarded the discharged 
worker, even where the employer is solely responsible for the discharge 
and where the union acted in good faith. 187 A union confronted by 
a weak discharge case faces a dilemma: either it accepts the expense 
of going to an arbitration it will probably lose or it risks a potentially 
costly fair representation suit. The decision to utilize the state system 
would probably protect a union that fails to invoke arbitration from 
allegations by its members that the union breached its duty of fair 
184. See Convention, supra note 2, art. 8(1). 
185. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191-93 (1967) (noting that this is accepted practice). 
186. In a typical arbitration, for instance, the union must pay not only for its lawyer's time, 
it must also pay one-half of the arbitrator's fee. 
187. See Bowen v. U.S. Postal Serv., 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983); see also infra note 189. 
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r~presentation. 188 This would mean that the employer alone would bear 
the cost of unfairly dismissing an employee, something not found in 
present law. 189 
D. Potential Impact of an American Statutory Guarantee 
In view of American employer resistance to the erosion of the 
employment-at-will doctrine, one might conclude that a statutory 
guarantee of fair dismissal was somehow detrimental to business. Yet, 
it is difficult to envision how such a guarantee could harm companies. 
If, as commonly claimed, most employers already use fair personnel 
practices, the enactment of a fair-dismissal statutory guarantee should 
have no impact whatever because a finding of unfair dismissal would 
be a rarity. Some employers may not intend to dismiss unfairly but 
lack sound personnel policies designed for consistent application; hence, 
discipline may be meted out unevenly and, therefore, unfairly. In these 
circumstances, referees might hold that the employer dismissed unfairly 
under the statutory guarantee and award damages according to the 
statutory formula. Such determinations should persuade these employers 
to re-evaluate their personnel policies and codify their fair practices 
into a statement of official personnel policy. Both employees and super-
visors would then have guidance on disciplinary standards and there 
should be fewer instances of unfair dismissal. 
Of course, a few employers may wish to control their workforce 
in an autocratic fashion, and retain the right to fire their workers 
regardless of the absence of valid grounds for discharge. Considera-
tions of equity demand that such situations be rectified. Yet, equity 
need not be gained at the expense of efficiency for it is highly unlikely 
that such employers run a cost-efficient operation. A workforce sub-
ject to erratic and arbitrary discharge is almost certain to have a poor 
productivity and quality-control record. 190 Employers who hire workers 
188. Small local unions which hesitate to send a weak case to arbitration because of the 
financial expense involved often worry about the cost of defending against a fair representation 
suit. See T. BOYCE, FAIR REPRESENTATION, THE NLRB, AND THE COURTS 68 (1978). On the plight 
of financially constrained unions, see 35 PROC. ANN. MEETING INDUS. REL. RESEARCH Assoc. 
(1983) (comments of Joyce Miller, vice president of the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers' 
Union, concerning the current state of arbitration). 
189. Bowen v. U.S. Postal Serv.'. 103 S.Ct. 588 (1983). In Bowen, an employee was dismissed 
after an altercation at work. The union processed his grievance through the steps of the pro-
cedure, but the national union failed to take the case to arbitration. The Supreme Court held 
that a union could be held liable for the part of the employee's backpay even though the employer 
was solely responsible for the unfair dismissal. Id. at 595. For a discussion of the practical im-
pact of this case, see When a Union Fails to Push a Grievance, Bus. WK., Feb. 14, 1983, at 130E. 
190. Current interest in Japanese management practices has led some American employers 
to introduce personnel programs, such as quality circles, as part of a policy of upgrading pro-
ductivity and quality control through improving employee morale. Building an employer-employee 
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casually and then fire those who were erroneously hired unnecessarily 
incur all the costs associated with employee turnover. The enactment 
of a statutory guarantee could have a positive impact on such employers 
by influencing them to adopt rational disciplinary standards. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States should act now to conform to world standards 
on unfair dismissal, standards that other highly industrialized nations 
have managed to implement. The experience of Great Britain 
demonstrates that establishing a statutory guarantee and creating a 
system to enforce that right need not disrupt labor-management rela-
tions, nor must it be expensive and highly legalistic to be effective. 
Moreover, the British legislation has had the salutary effect of encourag-
ing employers to improve their disciplinary policies and procedures. 
This Article has proposed a system, in many ways similar to the 
British system, that would conform to world standards on unfair 
dismissal and provide a modicum of uniformity throughout the na-
tion, while placing control firmly at the state level. The proposed system 
would use existing state unemployment compensation procedures, thus 
providing comprehensive coverage at modest additional cost. This 
modest cost and worker familiarity with hearing procedures should en-
courage a high proportion of those unfairly dismissed to avail themselves 
of the opportunity to challenge their dismissal. In addition, the right 
to be dismissed fairly and for just cause is a guarantee already familiar 
to labor relations practitioners and readily understood by employees. 
Those criticizing the enactment of statutory protection against un-
fair dismissal often focus on the difficulties of guaranteeing such a 
right - especially the cost. Although cost estimates are not given, these 
critics assume costs will be unacceptably high, whatever the figure. Sup-
porters of a statutory guarantee assert that a democratic society should 
not tolerate fundamental inequity merely because of the cost of 
eliminating the injustice. Although this latter position has merit, it fails 
to respond to an issue of critical concern to legislators: the feasibility 
of new fiscal expenditure in a decade of cutbacks in public service. 
One of the most important features of this Article's proposed statutory 
system is its modest additional cost to the public. It would not require 
a new bureaucracy, nor would it demand the hiring of many new 
employees to cope with an increased caseload. Rather, it would make 
additional use of an existing state agency, requiring certain employees 
relationship based on fair treatment is seen as essential to the success of such efforts. See generally 
B. Fisher, Remarks at the Meeting of the Philadelphia Chapter of the Industrial Relations Research 
Association (Oct. 13, 1981), reprinted in 108 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 168 (1981). 
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to perform one new task, at little extra cost. Finally, although enact-
ment of federal legislation on unfair dismissal in the current political 
atmosphere is highly unlikely, this Article proposes that a high degree 
of national uniformity can still be achieved merely by requiring each 
state to enact legislation guaranteeing the same right and providing 
for enforcement of the right through the same agency in each state. 
The pro-business political climate arising out of the current reces-
sion should not be hostile to such legislation. Some critics claim that 
the cost of complying with employment protection legislation, when 
no similar burden is placed on employers in other countries, is one 
reason why American business is uncompetitive. Even if somewhat valid 
in other contexts, this criticism certainly does not apply here. The pro-
tection against unfair dismissal typically granted in nearly all advanced 
industrial societies far exceeds the protection currently afforded American 
workers. Thus, if fair-dismissal legislation were enacted, American 
employers would not be operating at a competitive disadvantage in 
this area. That American multinational corporations routinely comply 
with these standards in their overseas operations indicates that impos-
ing such standards on employers in this country would not harm 
American business. 
·-
